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(Un)Conscious Judging
Elizabeth Thornburg*
Abstract
Fact inferences made by the trial judge are the lynchpin of civil
litigation. If inferences were a matter of universally held logical
deductions, this would not be troubling. Inferences, however, are
deeply contestable conclusions that vary from judge to judge.
Non-conscious psychological phenomena can lead to flawed
reasoning, implicit bias, and culturally influenced perceptions.
Inferences differ significantly, and they matter. Given the
homogeneous makeup of the judiciary, this is a significant concern.
This Article will demonstrate the ubiquity, importance, and
variability of inferences by examining actual cases in which trial
and appellate (or majority and dissenting) judges draw quite
different inferences from the same record. It will then review the
psychological literature to show ways in which judges are affected
by unconscious forces. It concludes by suggesting reforms to judicial
education, use of decision mechanisms that promote conscious
deliberation, and civil procedure rule changes designed to increase
information and decrease the impact of individual judges’
inferences.
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“[T]he test for determining whether an inference (from
circumstantial evidence) is a rational one is stated in terms of
mathematical precision but is one which allows the very
greatest latitude in actual application. . . . [T]he authoritative
language of nice and scientific precision in which such
conclusions are cast is after all only the language of delusive
exactness.” – Fleming James, Jr.1
“We may try to see things as objectively as we please. None the
less, we can never see them with any eyes except our own.”
– Benjamin Cardozo2
Motivated cognition is “the ubiquitous tendency of people to
form perceptions, and to process factual information generally,
in a manner congenial to their values and desires.”
– Dan M. Kahan3

I. Introduction
Inferences about facts are an integral and unavoidable part of
civil litigation. As in life, much of what we “know” are conclusions,
formed by drawing inferences from a collection of direct and
circumstantial evidence. Juries, for example, are instructed that
“[i]nferences are simply deductions or conclusions which reason
and common sense lead the jury to draw from the evidence received
in the case.”4 At trial, then, juries perform the intertwined
1. Fleming James, Jr., Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58
YALE L.J. 667, 673–74 (1949).
2. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 3 (Steven
A. Childress ed., Quid Pro Books 2010) (1921).
3. Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and
the Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 853 (2012).
4. KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET AL., 1A FED. JURY PRAC. & INSTR. § 12:05 (6th ed.
2019).
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functions of deciding what evidence to believe, what inferences to
draw (and not draw), and how the law applies to the facts it has
found.5
Trials, however, are not the only stage in which inferences
play a role, and judges, rather than juries, consciously and
unconsciously draw inferences that will shape the course of the
litigation and the parties’ likelihood of success. This has long been
recognized in the context of the pivotal pretrial rulings that take
the case away from the jury: dismissals on the pleadings and
summary judgment.6 Less obvious are the many other ways in
which judges make decisions based on facts during the pretrial
period, and the ways in which they employ inferences in doing so.
Although they do not technically end litigation, decisions about
issues such as discovery, joinder of claims and parties, and class
action status can have an enormous impact on the viability and
scope of litigation. Even decisions that are labeled as exercises of
discretion rather than as fact finding are often undergirded by the
judge’s belief about facts, and those beliefs are formed after
drawing inferences.
This Article will illuminate and critique the power of judicial
inferences, and will conclude by suggesting some changes in
training, process, and procedure rules that could improve the
inference-drawing process.7 While much law review literature
about inferences focuses on lawmaking, this Article will focus on
fact finding; while much focuses on appeals, this Article will look
at the pretrial stage. Trial judges’ myriad decisions are riddled
with inferences, and their role in finding facts makes them the
most important actors in influencing the course and outcome of
lawsuits.8 Part II briefly defines “inference” as it is used in this
5. In doing so, they will apply the applicable standard of proof, generally
“preponderance of the evidence” in civil cases. See generally Kevin M. Clermont,
Staying Faithful to the Standards of Proof, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2019)
(discussing the various standards of proof and their continued use in the legal
system).
6. See infra Part IV (illustrating judicial inferences in real cases including
motions on pleadings and summary judgement).
7. See infra Part V (discussing the ways judges use heuristics); see also infra
Part VI (suggesting ways to improve the judicial system).
8. This Article will focus on the federal courts and federal procedure, but
the same arguments would apply to state courts. Indeed, since many state court
judges are faced with much larger caseloads and far fewer resources, it is possible
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Article and discusses the inference-drawing process. It highlights
the powerful role of each judge’s own experience and world view in
that process.
The next two Parts document judges drawing pretrial
inferences and show why that matters. Part III uses a hypothetical
case to illustrate the types of pretrial decisions in which the trial
judge’s choices about inferences can be decisive. Part IV takes the
discussion from the theoretical into real courts and decisions. Both
Parts demonstrate that judges may find different facts because
they have chosen different inferences, even though dealing with
the same record.
After these Parts establish the pervasiveness of inferences and
of the potential impact of disagreements, Part V brings together
judicial decisions and psychological research. It begins by
introducing the psychology and behavioral economics9 scholarship
that describes the ways in which the human brain processes
information and reaches decisions, including the use of
heuristics.10 It then demonstrates that judges, like all other
humans, are influenced in their thinking by factors such as
heuristics, implicit biases, and cultural cognition.11 Nor does their
combination of legal education, judicial experience, and judicial
education overcome those effects in most cases.12 Further,
that the need for fast decisions and tendency toward oral rather than written
opinions would exacerbate the problems discussed in this Article.
9. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011); CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (2000).
10. A “heuristic” is
a mental shortcut that allows people to solve problems and make
judgments quickly and efficiently. These rule-of-thumb strategies
shorten decision-making time and allow people to function without
constantly stopping to think about their next course of action.
Heuristics are helpful in many situations, but they can also lead to
cognitive biases.
Kendra Cherry, Heuristics and Cognitive Biases, VERYWELL MIND
https://perma.cc/L6G3-U4M2 (last updated July 26, 2019) (last visited Aug. 30,
2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
11. See infra Part IV.B.
12. Not only is the common cliché that judges just “call balls and strikes”
inaccurate, some studies show that NBA referees and MLB umpires show implicit
bias effects in their officiating. See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the
Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1178 (2012) (discussing the various biases of
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empirical studies linking judicial decisions with the judges’ own
race and gender provide evidence that inferences may be especially
problematic in cases where race, gender, and other characteristics
are salient.13 Given the homogeneous makeup of the federal
judiciary,14 this is a significant concern.
Part VI suggests some reforms on individual and systemic
levels that might improve judicial inferences: 1) provide judicial
education designed to raise judges’ awareness of their own
inference-making and increase their knowledge of the experiences
and worldviews of others; 2) implement mechanisms that activate
and facilitate deliberative mental processes; and 3) change the
interpretation and application of the procedure rules to support
rather than reject alternative inferences and decrease the impact
of a single judge’s intuitions. Part VII concludes with overall
lessons on recognizing and offsetting the inevitable impact of
cognitive biases on fact finding.
II. Defining “Inference” and Inference-Drawing
The kind of inferences and inference-drawing discussed in this
Article are what Black’s Law Dictionary refers to as an “inferential
fact”—a “fact established by conclusions drawn from other
evidence rather than from direct testimony or evidence; a fact
derived logically from other facts.”15 That derivation goes beyond
the literal limits of the testimony. As Professor Dan Simon has
pointed out, “[a]n inference is typically defined as any cognitive
process of reasoning, in which a person goes beyond some known
data to generate a new proposition. The result of an inference,
then, is the addition of information to the person’s mental
representation of an issue.”16 For example, evidence might consist
professional sports judges).
13. See Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An
Empirical Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117,
1129–35 (2009) (summarizing multiple analyses concluding that judges’ race
significantly affects outcomes in workplace racial harassment cases).
14. See infra notes 402–419 and accompanying text (discussing the makeup
of the federal judiciary).
15. Inferential Fact, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
16. Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30
RUTGERS L.J. 1, 42 (1998) (citing THE BLACKWELL DICTIONARY OF COGNITIVE
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of a properly authenticated videotape of a bank robbery showing
the robber wearing a yellow rain hat as well as testimony from a
police officer that a search of the defendant’s home produced a
yellow rain hat (introducing into evidence the hat, which looks like
the one on the video). An inference from that evidence might be
that it is the same hat, and, further, that the defendant robbed the
bank.17
What is the process by which inferences are drawn or not
drawn? Scholars describe it differently, but all recognize that
inferences spring from the decisionmaker’s beliefs about the world,
their “generalizations.”18 Rationalist evidence analysis looks at
evidence and inferences as logical chains, considering each piece of
evidence together with generalizations that are said to justify (or
not justify) an inference.19
Cognitive psychologists describe the fact-finding process,
including inferences, as based on the construction of stories.20
Their experiments show that jurors impose a narrative
organization on trial evidence.21 The ways in which they do so
PSYCHOLOGY 186 (Michael W. Eysenck ed., 1991) and Gilbert Harman,
Rationality, in 3 AN INVITATION TO COGNITIVE SCIENCE: THINKING 175, 184
(Edward E. Smith & Daniel N. Osherson eds., 2d ed. 1995)).
17. See id. (“Inferences are vectoral in character: they constitute some form
of extension of datum towards some new knowledge, stated in the form of a
preposition.”).
18. See TERENCE ANDERSON, DAVID SCHUM & WILLIAM TWINING, ANALYSIS OF
EVIDENCE 100 (William Twining & Christopher J. McCrudden eds., 2d ed. 2005)
(“Every inference is dependent upon a generalization.”).
19. See David H. Kaye, What is Bayesianism? A Guide for the Perplexed, 28
JURIMETRICS J. 161, 170–72 (1988) (noting that even under a mathematical model
of reasoning such as Bayesian theory, the results are affected both by peoples’
prior beliefs and by the likelihood ratios they assign to new pieces of information).
For a helpful chart showing the interaction of evidence and generalizations (and
also the impact of information relevant to credibility decisions), see ANDERSON ET
AL., supra note 18, at 61, Figure 2.5.
20. See Reid Hastie, Introduction, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
JUROR DECISION MAKING 3, 24 (Reid Hastie, ed., 1993) (“[A] narrative structure is
imposed on evidence as it is comprehended by a juror who is making a
decision . . . .”). The story model may be a less helpful explanation in contexts that
do not have much of a story structure. See also Dan Simon, Thin Empirics, 23
INT’L J. EVID. & PROOF 82, 83–85 (2019) (discussing the shortcomings of the story
model).
21. See Hastie, supra note 20, at 24 (“Pennington and Hastie’s empirical
research supports the ‘psychological validity’ of story structures as descriptions of
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require jurors to use their knowledge of the world—their
generalizations—plus their knowledge about the expected
structure of stories in reacting to trial evidence.22 “Analyses of
inference chains leading to story events reveal that intermediate
conclusions are established by converging lines of reasoning which
rely on deduction from world knowledge, analogies to experienced
and hypothetical episodes, and reasoning by contradiction.”23
The judicial system’s confidence in generalizations is based on
an assumption that judges and jurors share a body of knowledge
that will make inferences fairly uniform.24 However, this
assumption is problematic.
This . . . is commonly described as “general experience,”
“background knowledge,” “common sense,” or “society’s stock of
knowledge.” . . . [W]e need to ask, whose experience, sense, or
knowledge? . . . The bases for such generalizations are as varied
as the sources for the beliefs themselves—education, direct
experience, the media, gossip, fiction, fantasy, speculation,
prejudice, and so on.25

Judges, who like jurors operate by using human cognition, can
be expected to use the same kind of evidence-generalization links
to analyze inferences, and to be similarly dependent on their own
experiences in forming, using, and analyzing generalizations.26
jurors’ representations of evidence . . . .”).
22. See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror
Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 525 (1991) (“Because
all jurors hear the same evidence and have the same general knowledge about the
expected structure of stories, differences in story construction must arise from
differences in world knowledge.”). Although it was developed in the context of
criminal cases, the applicability of the Story Model in at least some civil cases has
been demonstrated by later research. See, e.g., Jill E. Huntley & Mark Costanzo,
Sexual Harassment Stories: Testing a Story-Mediated Model of Juror DecisionMaking in Civil Litigation, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 29, 45 (2003) (“[I]n sexual
harassment cases, the story model of juror decision-making appears to be
useful.”). For a recent examination of the story model, see generally Dominic
Willmott et al., Introduction and Validation of the Juror Decision Scale (JDS): An
Empirical Investigation of the Story Model, 57 J. CRIM. JUST. 26 (2018).
23. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 22, at 524.
24. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 269 (“[I]t is assumed that the triers
of fact, including jurors, come already equipped with a largely shared ‘stock of
knowledge’ which is the main source of warrants for making inferences in
arguments about questions of fact.”).
25. Id.
26. See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV.
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When judges draw inferences, or when they decide whether a
reasonable jury could draw an inference, they are injecting not just
logic but also their own store of generalizations into the mix.27 This
is doubly important because the kind of reasoning involved in the
inference process often operates intuitively.28 “The reasoner does
not consciously identify the generalizations upon which her
inferences depend.”29
III. A Tale of Two Judges
In order to make the impact of fact inferences clearer, consider
the ways in which two different judges might react to pretrial
issues raised in the same lawsuit.
Two hypothetical judges, Judge A and Judge B, will rule on
various motions. The point is not that one or the other judge is
correct, but that their inferences may well vary significantly, with
important consequences for the course of the litigation. For both of
our hypothetical judges, the lawsuit begins with a complaint
making the following allegations:
Acme Motors designs, manufactures, and sells an all-electric
car, called the Greeny, which debuted in 2012. The Greeny was very
popular with eco-conscious buyers, and all was going well for a
number of years. Unfortunately, in 2016 the older model Greeny
cars began to have a problem. Drivers began to experience
unintended acceleration—without warning the car accelerates, and
braking will not stop it.
Plaintiff David Driver purchased a new Greeny in 2013. He
believes that this defect in his 2013 Greeny is what caused a horrible
crash in 2017 that left him with persistent back pain, lost past
income and future earning capacity, and unpaid medical bills.
777, 821 (2001) [hereinafter Judicial Mind] (“Like the rest of us, [judges] use
heuristics that can produce systematic errors in judgment.”).
27. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 269 (explaining how triers of fact
fall on background generalizations in the absence of experts or other direct
evidence).
28. See id. at 101 (“In most contexts, inductive reasoning operates
intuitively.”).
29. Id.
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Driver alleges that the unintended acceleration problem is caused
by electronic failures and an inadequate fault detection system, and
that a safer design would include a brake override system. His
complaint asserts legal theories of negligence, product liability
(defective design), and gross negligence, and he seeks both
compensatory and punitive damages.
Co-plaintiff Oscar Owner also purchased a new 2013 Greeny.
He has not experienced the unintended acceleration problem or been
injured, but he alleges that the value of his Greeny is dramatically
lower than Acme represented due to this undisclosed defect and
argues that Acme has breached its warranty and violated state
consumer protection statutes by failing to disclose known problems
with the car. He seeks compensation for the reduced resale value of
his 2013 Greeny.
Now consider a series of pretrial decisions and the ways in
which inferences play a role.
A. Motion to Dismiss
Acme has denied all of the plaintiffs’ claims, and also alleges
that Driver’s accident was caused by his own negligence. In
addition, Acme has filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the plaintiffs fail to state a
claim because they have not identified a specific defect responsible
for unintended acceleration, and thus have not alleged sufficient
facts to make plaintiffs’ claims plausible.
Judge A denies the motion to dismiss, finding the allegations
that the car unexpectedly accelerated and would not brake and
that an alternative braking system would have stopped the car, to
be facts rather than conclusions. Based on those pleaded facts,
Judge A believes that inferences of negligence and defective design
are at least as plausible as other inferences. In addition, Judge A
believes that the complaint’s allegations that prior to 2013 other
Greeny owners had complained to Acme about injuries from
unintended acceleration are sufficient to support a plausible
inference of gross negligence. With regard to Owner’s warranty
claims, Judge A is satisfied that it is reasonable to infer a causal
link between the pattern of unexpected acceleration and the
decrease in resale value of Owner’s car. In summary, Judge A holds
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that the plaintiffs’ complaint meets the requirements of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and that Acme’s motion seeks more
specificity than is required at the pleading stage.30
Judge B is concerned that the complaint does little more than
recite the elements required for negligence and design defect
claims and treats many of the allegations as conclusions rather
than facts. Even treating them as facts, Judge B is especially
unconvinced by the inference that, based on customer complaints,
Acme knew or should have known of a general problem with
unintended acceleration. Judge B grants the motion to dismiss.
Judge B does, however, grant plaintiffs leave to amend to identify
more specifically the defect and safer alternative design and the
sources of Acme’s knowledge of a pattern of unintended
acceleration, as well as facts tying publicity about the acceleration
to changes in used Greeny prices.
B. Joinder of Parties and Claims
Assume that both judges have allowed this suit to go forward.
Acme has filed a motion to sever the claims of Driver and Owner,
arguing that they do not arise out of the same transaction or
occurrence as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20.
Judge A denies the motion. Judge A believes that some of the
evidence of breach, defect, and causation that will support the
inferences needed for the personal injury claims will also support
a strong inference with respect to the decreased value of the
Greeny, and that evidence of Acme’s knowledge (part of Driver’s
gross negligence claim) will also support an inference of a knowing
violation of the state’s consumer law. Based on his beliefs about
the validity of those inferences from common evidence, Judge A
concludes that there is both a logical relationship and significant
evidentiary overlap between Driver’s and Owner’s claims.
Judge B, on the other hand, grants the motion to sever. Judge
B concludes that evidence about the nature of Acme’s design and
knowledge of risks of harm has only a tangential relationship to
30. Cf. In re Toyota Motor Corp., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1219–22 (C.D. Cal.
2010) (discussing whether the plaintiff adequately offered specific allegations of
defect in Toyota’s electronic throttle control system).
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the resale value of Greeny vehicles, because any inference that the
nature of the defect affected the resale value is weak at best.
Instead, Judge B believes that a plausible inference of loss of value
would require proof of lowered resale prices immediately after the
public claims about of the unintended acceleration problem
(whether or not such a problem really exists). In the absence of
plausible inferences from shared evidence, Judge B concludes that
the requirements of Rule 20 have not been met.
C. Discovery
Initial disclosures have been made and formal discovery is
now under way. For example, the plaintiffs have sent Acme a
request for production of documents that includes a request for “all
communications received by Acme from Greeny purchasers
claiming that a Greeny car from model years 2012–15 experienced
unintended acceleration.” (All parties agree that the Greeny’s
design did not change in any relevant way during this time period.)
Acme has objected that the request is irrelevant and asserted that
the cost of compliance would be disproportionate. The parties have
conferred but have been unable to reach agreement, so the
plaintiffs have filed a motion to compel production of the requested
documents.
Judge A grants the motion to compel. Judge A sees a potential
for reasonable inferences from other drivers’ experiences to
plaintiffs’ claims. Judge A believes that the existence of other
unintended acceleration accidents supports an inference that
Driver’s car suffered from the same problem. In addition, the
complaints themselves might show that Acme had been notified of
a troubling pattern of malfunctions leading to injuries, which could
support the inference required to prove gross negligence. Finally,
thinks Judge A, the pattern of complaints might support an
inference of the extent of the impact of the alleged defect on resale
value. With regard to proportionality, because of Judge A’s
assessment of the strength of the inference from other complaints
to the elements of plaintiffs’ claims, the information sought is very
important to resolving the issues. Judge A also infers from these
two plaintiffs’ claims and the nature of the national car market
that the Greeny’s safety issues may be causing nationwide

(UN)CONSCIOUS JUDGING

1579

problems, making the issues at stake important and the overall
amount in controversy quite large. Judge A believes from general
experience that individual plaintiffs likely have fewer resources
and less access to information than does Acme and that Acme has
likely overstated the cost of compliance with this discovery request.
All in all, Judge A concludes that the information sought is
relevant and proportional to the needs of the case.
Judge B’s approach is quite the opposite. Since Judge B
granted the motion to sever, this version of the lawsuit includes
only plaintiff Driver’s claims. Judge B believes that complaints
from other Greeny owners support only a very weak inference, if
any, about what happened to Driver’s car. Judge B thinks Driver
will instead need to show plausible inferences from the evidence of
the condition of Driver’s own car, the accident involving Driver,
and evidence about Acme’s design of the 2013 vehicle. Nor does
Judge B find an inference from complaint letters to gross
negligence at all convincing. As to proportionality, Judge B (based
on the assessment that the inferences are weak) believes that the
requested complaints would not be at all important in resolving
the liability issues. Although Judge B thinks a nationwide product
defect could be significant, this discovery request is insufficiently
tied to that, and the amount in controversy is limited to Driver’s
own damages. While Acme has greater access to information,
Judge B believes based on the judge’s experience as a lawyer and
a judge that the plaintiffs’ lawyer is probably seeking discovery
about other owners’ complaints primarily to run up Acme’s costs
and to seek out other potential clients. Judge B’s conclusion: the
inference from customer complaints to elements of Driver’s claims
is so weak that it is only marginally relevant, and the cost of
compliance far exceeds the needs of the case. Judge B denies the
motion to compel.
D. Summary Judgment
It is difficult to frame a short but rich and realistic
hypothetical on summary judgment. Note, though, that analysis of
inferences will be critical to the resolution of a summary judgment
motion. Assume that Acme has filed a motion for partial summary
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judgment on Driver’s product liability claim, arguing that Driver
will not have sufficient evidence to support an inference of
defective design. In addition to the judges’ differing assessment of
probability reflected in their rulings on the 12(b)(6) motion,
assume that part of the summary judgment dispute will include a
decision about whether plaintiff’s engineering expert satisfies the
requirements of Daubert31 and will be allowed to testify.
Even the decision about whether to allow an expert to testify
requires evaluation of inferences. When the question is whether
the inferences to which the expert wishes to testify meet the
admissibility requirements of Daubert, judges as gatekeepers
evaluate scientific inferences.32 The case-specific factual
underpinnings of the expert opinion might also differ, depending
on what information has been unearthed during discovery, and a
judge might also reject the reliability of an expert’s inferences
based on fewer bits of information, which in turn relates back to
the discovery differences highlighted above. Judge A might
ultimately rule that the expert’s testimony can be considered,
while Judge B might rule that it cannot.
It would not be surprising, then, if Judge A were to deny the
summary judgment motion, finding that a reasonable jury could
choose to draw the inferences needed for findings of design defect
from the plaintiff’s circumstantial evidence and expert testimony,
and for Judge B to grant the motion, concluding that inferences of
Acme’s liability are too weak in light of alternative inferences of
Acme’s lack of fault and Driver’s contributory negligence.
E. Putting it Together
Looking at all of these pretrial decisions, one can see that
inference-drawing across a series of pretrial rulings can have a
tremendous influence on the course of litigation. It is clearest that
31. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993)
(holding that in determining whether to admit an expert witness’s scientific
testimony, the trial judge should assess whether it is based on scientifically valid
reasoning that can properly be applied to the facts at issue).
32. See Margaret Berger, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony, in
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 19–21 (Fed. Judicial Ctr., 3d. ed.
2011) (discussing the various considerations judges analyze when ruling on
Daubert challenges).
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judicial inferences play a decisive role in rulings on dispositive
motions. However, inferences about facts also play a significant
role in other procedural rulings, in ways that often lie beneath
exercises of discretion and balancing tests.33
This thought experiment, though, is an academic construct.
Are inferences similarly pervasive in real cases? Part IV will use
examples from actual litigation to highlight inferences at work in
various pretrial contexts. And just as was true for the hypothetical
dueling judges, real cases show judges finding different facts from
the same record because they disagree about what inferences
should be drawn.
IV. Judicial Inferences in Real Life
Real cases do not come in identical pairs for purposes of
comparing inferences, but trial court decisions involving inferences
are sometimes appealed, and the contrast between the trial court
and appellate court decisions can turn, even in procedural rulings,
on judges’ disagreements about the plausibility of inferences.34
Similarly, appellate decisions with a dissent may reveal that
judges on the panel have chosen different inferences, and hence

33. Even though many such decisions would be reviewed on appeal using an
“abuse of discretion” standard of review, the propriety of the exercise of discretion
is intertwined with underlying fact finding, which in turn depends on the court’s
inferences. See, e.g., Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., LLC, No. 3:10cv135-DPJFKB, 2014 WL 12639863 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 22, 2014), vacated and remanded, 838
F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2016) (discussing discovery orders); see also infra notes
153– 179 and accompanying text (discussing Kuttner v. Zaruba, 819 F.3d 970 (7th
Cir. 2016)).
34. The cases highlighted in this Part were identified by searching the
Westlaw “Federal District Courts” database for cases decided in the prior twelve
months. I searched for cases on particular topics (e.g. discovery, summary
judgment, class actions, etc.), and then read all of them to find examples of cases
in which inferences played an important role. Within that set, I searched for cases
that had been reversed on appeal, or for cases in which there was a dissent in the
court of appeals. From those results, I chose cases that would be good illustrations
of the impact of inferences. This does not claim to be either a random or
comprehensive study. It would be interesting to see a more quantitative study,
perhaps of all the cases decided in a particular district over a given time period.
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different facts.35 This Part will examine some contrasting opinions
as examples.
A. Dispositive Motions
The impact of inference is at its most obvious in rulings on
dispositive motions—motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6)36 and motions for summary judgment. As with
the hypothetical judges, the point is not that some judges are right
and others are wrong, but that the same record can lead judges to
opposite conclusions, based in large measure on the ways in which
their “experience and common sense,” operating through
unconscious heuristics and biases, guide their inferences.37 The
35. See generally Suja Thomas, Reforming the Summary Judgment Problem:
The Consensus Requirement, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2241 (2018) (suggesting that
fact-based summary judgment appeals with dissents should be treated as per se
indications that a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party). Decisions
in the courts of appeal with dissents do show both inferences at play and judges
who would choose different inferences from the same record. See, e.g., Tyree v.
Foxx, 835 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2016) (drawing different inferences about the
relevance of decisions similar to, but distinct from, the one that affected the
plaintiff); Fears v. Kasich (In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litig.), 845 F.3d 231 (6th
Cir. 2016) (disagreeing about whether circumstantial evidence supports the
inference that disclosure of the identity of a manufacturer of lethal injection drug
would make it difficult for the state to acquire such drugs).
36. There are a huge number of pleading cases in which inferences play a
key role—not surprising since the word “inference” is baked into the legal test
created by Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Iqbal. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009). See, e.g., Johnson v. City of New York, 16-CV-6426(KAM)(VMS), 2018 WL
1597393, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2018) (approving inferences in favor of the
plaintiff in an employment case); Wysong Corp. v. APN, Inc., 889 F.3d 267,
271– 72 (6th Cir. 2018) (rejecting inference of customer confusion about the
quality of pet food based on the court’s assumptions about consumer knowledge
of “puffery”); KAABOOWorks Servs., LLC v. Pilsl, No. 17-CV-02530-CMA-KLM,
2018 WL 2984801, at *6 (D. Colo. June 14, 2018) (finding inference of use or
disclosure of stolen trade secrets plausible); Zaidan v. Trump, 317 F. Supp. 3d 8,
20 (D.D.C. 2018) (accepting inference that the government had placed the plaintiff
on a “kill list” as plausible, despite other plausible inferences); Ortiz v.
Parkchester N. Condo., No. 16-CV-9646 (VSB), 2018 WL 2976011, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
June 13, 2018) (rejecting inference that existence of multiple prior lawsuits
showed that violations were widespread and persistent).
37. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking
on the Bench: How Judges Decided Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 29 (2007)
[hereinafter Blinking] (“The results of our CRT and judicial decision-making
studies show that intuition influences judicial decision making.”).
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differences can be observed on at least two levels: 1) which
evidence in the record the judges notice and consider; and 2) which
inferences the judges believe could reasonably be drawn from that
evidence. In the pleading context, evaluation of inferences includes
a comparative process; in order to keep the case alive, the
nonmovant must convince the judge that the inference s/he needs
is at least as believable as alternative inferences.38
1. Pleadings Motions: Lewis v. Bentley39
In ruling on motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the
court is instructed to analyze the complaint to identify only
pleaded “facts,” and then to determine whether the inferences the
lawsuit needs to proceed can plausibly be drawn from those facts.
As Justice Kennedy stated:
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged—but it has not “show[n]”—“that the
pleader is entitled to relief.”40

The requirement to go beyond “mere possibility” involves a
comparison of inferences.41 Later in the opinion, Justice Kennedy
rejects the plaintiffs’ inferences because there are “more likely
explanations.”42 In ruling on 12(b)(6) motions, then, the trial court
will be deciding which inference it finds more believable (and,
using a de novo standard of review, the court of appeals will be
doing the same analysis).43
38. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).
39. Lewis v. Bentley, No. 2:16-CV-690, 2017 WL 432464, at *1 (N.D. Ala.
Feb. 1, 2017), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Lewis v. Governor of Alabama,
896 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted, 914 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2018).
40. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citations omitted).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 681.
43. See Lewis, 2017 WL 432464, at *2 (determining the plausibility of
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Lewis v. Bentley arose out of a dispute between the State of
Alabama and the City of Birmingham over the city’s desire to adopt
a minimum wage higher than the federally mandated $7.25 per
hour.44 Birmingham passed a local ordinance with a higher
minimum wage, but the State, just as Birmingham’s ordinance
was set to go into effect, enacted the “Alabama Uniform Minimum
Wage and Right-to-Work Act.”45 According to its terms, the Act was
intended to “ensure that [labor] regulation and policy is applied
uniformly throughout the state.”46 It went beyond minimum wage
law to establish the state’s “complete control” over not only
minimum wage policy, but also most other employment law
issues.47
A number of Birmingham residents and public interest groups
filed suit, alleging that the Act had the purpose and effect of
transferring control of employment in Birmingham from municipal
officials elected by a majority-black local electorate to statewide
legislators elected by a majority-white electorate, with the intent
of discriminating on the basis of race against the people who live
and work in Birmingham.48 The district court found that
Birmingham’s complaint failed to plausibly allege intentional
discrimination and dismissed the case on the pleadings.49 Focusing
on the city’s equal protection claim, the Eleventh Circuit
reversed.50
Disagreements about inferences explain these divergent
results. The trial judge—U.S. District Judge David
Proctor51— focused on the supremacy of state government over
plaintiff’s claims and drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant);
Lewis, 896 F.3d at 1289 (“[W]e review the grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss de novo, ‘accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing
them in light most favorable to the plaintiff.’”).
44. Lewis, 2017 WL 432464, at *1.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at *2.
49. Id. at *13.
50. See Lewis v. Governor of Ala., 896 F.3d 1282, 1297 (11th Cir. 2018)
(citation omitted) (“We believe [plaintiffs’] ‘allegations entitle them to make good
on their claim.’”).
51. See David Proctor, BALLOTPEDIA, https://perma.cc/Z4CM-FQQC (last
visited Sept. 11, 2018) (providing background on Judge Proctor) (on file with the
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municipal government and noted that other states had adopted
similar laws.52 To Judge Proctor, these race-neutral explanations
were more believable than an inference of intentional
discrimination.53 He found that there were “obvious alternative
explanations” suggesting lawful conduct.54
Contrast that with the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion—written by
Judge Charles Wilson55—which both highlighted different
evidence and found different inferences to be plausible:
•

“Birmingham . . . [is] home to the largest black
population in Alabama (72%), which is reflected in the
racial composition of its city council.”56

•

The bill was introduced by a white state representative
from a town where only 1.5% of the residents are black,
with eventual support from fifty-two additional
sponsors, all of whom were white.57

•

No black member of the Alabama legislature voted in
favor of the bill.58

•

The State of Alabama has a “deep and troubled history
of racial discrimination,” and “has consistently impeded
the efforts of its black citizens to achieve social and
economic equality.”59

•

In terms of predictable impact, the Act “immediately
denied a significant wage increase to roughly 40,000

Washington and Lee Law Review).
52. Lewis v. Bentley, No. 2:16-CV-690, 2017 WL 432464, at *1 (N.D. Ala.
Feb. 1, 2017), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Lewis v. Governor of Ala., 896
F.3d 1282 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted, 914 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2018) (stating that
plaintiffs’ allegation of intentional discrimination failed to “nudge” their claim
across the plausibility threshold).
53. See id. at *13 (“Without specific factual allegations of an intent to
discriminate on the part of any particular legislators, plaintiffs’ equal protection
claims fail.”).
54. Id. at *11.
55. See Charles Wilson (Florida), BALLOTPEDIA, https://perma.cc/3B96-DK24
(last visited Sept. 11, 2018) (providing background on Judge Wilson) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
56. Lewis, 896 F.3d at 1287–88.
57. Id. at 1288.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1295.

1586

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1567 (2019)
Birmingham residents, the vast majority of whom were
black.”60

Judge Wilson and the members of the Eleventh Circuit panel
evaluated inferences quite differently from Judge Proctor, finding
that these “facts plausibly imply discriminatory motivations were
at play.”61 They therefore found dismissal on the pleadings to have
been erroneous.62
2. Summary Judgment: Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc.63
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
summary judgment “shall” be granted “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”64 Courts applying this
test regularly recite that a dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could grant a verdict in favor of the
nonmovant.65 While the judge should not be comparing
inferences,66 some opinions cite the possibility of alternative
inferences in rejecting the one sought by the nonmovant as
unreasonable.67 Judicial preferences for differing inferences
therefore can have a significant impact on their rulings on
fact-based summary judgment motions.68
60. Id.
61. Compare Lewis v. Governor of Ala., 896 F.3d 1282, 1295 (11th Cir. 2018)
(finding plaintiffs’ “detailed factual allegations” support plausible discriminatory
motivations), with Lewis, 2017 WL 432464, at *13 (determining plaintiffs did not
support “conclusory, shotgun allegations” of discriminatory motivations).
62. See Lewis, 896 F.3d at 1299 (deciding that plaintiffs have stated
plausible claims).
63. 550 F. Supp. 2d 140 (D. Me. 2008), rev’d, 561 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2009).
64. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
65. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (citation
omitted) (stating that at summary judgment, the trial judge should not “weigh
the evidence and determine the truth of the matter”).
66. But see Ryan Lee Hart, Deterrence and Fairness: Why the Current
Financial Crisis Demands a Product-Oriented Relaxation of the PSLRA, 5 SETON
HALL CIR. REV. 411, 430 (2009) (noting that judges often compare inferences when
determining if the scienter requirement is fulfilled in securities class actions).
67. See Chadwick, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 145–46 (rejecting the nonmoving
party’s inference and accepting the inference drawn by the moving defendant).
68. Although they do not always explicitly refer to “inferences,” summary
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Laurie Chadwick, a longtime employee of WellPoint, was
denied a promotion.69 She alleged that WellPoint “failed to promote
her because of a sex-based stereotype that women who are
mothers, particularly of young children, neglect their jobs in favor
of their presumed childcare responsibilities,” and filed suit against

judgment cases turning on the likely sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence in
the summary judgment record also turn on judges’ assessment of whether
inferences would be reasonable. One of the best known examples of differing
inferences in the summary judgment context is Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372
(2007), in which the district judge, court of appeals judges, and Justice Stevens
disagreed with the Supreme Court majority about the inferences to be drawn from
a videotape and other parts of the summary judgment record. Compare Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007) (majority opinion) (“Respondent’s version of
events is so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have
believed him.”), with 550 U.S. 372, 390 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“More
importantly, [the videotape] surely does not provide a principled basis for
depriving the respondent of his right to have a jury evaluate the question . . . .”),
and Harris v. Coweta Cty., 433 F.3d 807, 815 (11th Cir. 2005) (rejecting “the
defendants’ argument that Harris’ driving must, as a matter of law, be considered
sufficiently reckless to give Scott probable cause to believe that he posed a
substantial threat of imminent physical harm to motorists”), and Harris v.
Coweta Cty., No. 3:01CV148, 2003 WL 25419527, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2003)
(finding that “a fact issue remains regarding whether Scott violated the Fourth
Amendment by using excessive force to seize Harris”). See, e.g., Bell v. Prefix, Inc.,
321 F. App’x 423, 426–27 (6th Cir. 2009) (analyzing inferences that could be
drawn from plaintiff’s evidence of pretext in FMLA case); Corbitt v. Home Depot
U.S.A., Inc., 589 F.3d 1136, 1165 (11th Cir. 2009) (disagreeing regarding
inferences to be drawn in sexual harassment and retaliation case), vacated, 598
F.3d 1259 (2010); Peck v. Elyria Foundry Co., 347 F. App’x 139, 142–43 (6th Cir.
2009) (drawing contrasting inferences in Title VII case with majority and dissent
emphasizing different evidence from the summary judgment record). The reversal
rate of orders granting summary judgment is another indicator that judges
disagree with each other significantly about what inferences are reasonable. See
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Taking Cognitive Illiberalism Seriously: Judicial Humility,
Aggregate Efficiency, and Acceptable Justice, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 627, 650–53
(2012) (emphasizing that trial court decisions on summary judgment are affirmed
only slightly more than half of the time). For further examples of trial and
appellate court judges disagreeing about inferences in the summary judgment
context, see Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender
and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 739–45 (2007) (noting the
different inferences that can be drawn from evidence about the work
environment).
69. Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 40–41.
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the company.70 At the trial court level, the magistrate judge and
district judge granted WellPoint’s motion for summary judgment,
concluding that Chadwick’s circumstantial evidence could not
support a reasonable inference of discrimination based on sex.71
The First Circuit panel (using a de novo standard of review)
reversed, finding that a reasonable jury could draw just such an
inference.72
At the time WellPoint chose to promote a different employee
(also a woman) to the desired “Team Lead” position, Chadwick was
the mother of four: an eleven-year-old child plus six-year-old
triplets.73 Her husband was the children’s primary caregiver, and
there was no suggestion in the record that her work performance
had ever suffered due to childcare responsibilities.74 Chadwick had
worked in her current position at WellPoint for seven years, and
she scored 4.4 out of 5.0 on her most recent performance review.75
The other finalist for the Team Leader job, Donna Ouelette,
also had children, ages ten and fifteen.76 (It is unclear, though,
whether the decisionmaker was aware that Ouelette was a
parent.77) She had been in her position for a year, and she scored
3.84 on her performance review.78 After interviews with a panel of
three employees, including Chadwick’s supervisor Nanci Miller,
Ouelette was chosen for the promotion.79

70. Id. at 41.
71. See Chadwick, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 147 (opining that there was nothing
contained in the summary judgment record beyond an “assumption” that Miller
discriminated against working mothers of young children).
72. See Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 48 (1st Cir. 2009) (“We only
conclude that Chadwick has presented sufficient evidence of sex-based
stereotyping to have her day in court.”).
73. Id. at 42.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 41–42.
76. Id. at 42.
77. Id. at 42 n.4 (“[T]he record does not support the inference that WellPoint
knew of Ouelette’s status as a mother of two children, while it is uncontested that
WellPoint knew of Chadwick's children.”). But see Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc.,
550 F. Supp. 2d 140, 141 n.1 (D. Me. 2008) (putting the burden on the plaintiff to
show a lack of awareness of Ouelette’s children and, in the absence of evidence,
assuming awareness).
78. Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 41–42.
79. Id.
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Because the summary judgment context requires the judge to
view all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant,
both the trial and appellate courts assumed that Chadwick had
stronger qualifications than Ouelette.80 They also recognized that
society is influenced by stereotypes about working women with
children.81 However, they disagreed decisively about the
inferential power of Chadwick’s circumstantial evidence, which
consisted primarily of the information narrated above plus
comments made to Chadwick in the course of the decision about
promotion.82
First, when Miller learned that Chadwick had three
six-year-olds, she said, “Oh my—I did not know you had
triplets . . . [sic] Bless you!”83 U.S. District Judge D. Brock
Hornby84 considered inferences in favor of the movant—perhaps
any bias reflected by this remark was a gender-neutral concern
about parents rather than mothers.85 He looked for evidence that
Miller would not have said the same thing to the father of triplets,
found it lacking, and therefore rejected an inference that gender
played a role in Miller’s decision.86 Based on his experience and his
beliefs about how the world works, Judge Hornby inferred that
“[b]less you” was a phrase with “ordinary meaning”—a mere
80. Note, though, that the district judge conceded only that Chadwick had
“somewhat better qualifications,” Chadwick, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 142, while the
appellate panel stated, “[i]t is a fair inference that Chadwick’s qualifications
significantly outweighed those of Ouelette.” Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 42 n.3.
81. See Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 45 (“[S]ex-based stereotypes regarding
women, families, and work are alive and well in our society.”); Chadwick, 550 F.
Supp. 2d at 146 (“[C]ultural stereotypes certainly exist in our society about a
mother’s role.”).
82. See Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 46 n.9 (finding a jury “could infer” Chadwick
was rejected because “as a woman with four young children, [she] would not give
her all to her job”); Chadwick, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 147 (opining that Chadwick has
only “assumption or conjecture that Miller was stereotyping her”).
83. Chadwick, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 142.
84. See D. Brock Hornby, BALLOTPEDIA, https://perma.cc/7UTG-EWDA (last
visited Oct. 14, 2019) (providing background on Judge Hornby) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
85. See Chadwick, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 146 (suggesting Miller’s comments
could have been made out of admiration for parents raising triplets).
86. See id. at 147 (“Nothing in the record suggests a general atmosphere of
sex-based stereotyping.”).

1590

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1567 (2019)

“friendly exclamation” with uses ranging from a response to a
sneeze to a religious invocation.87
In contrast, Judge Normal Stahl,88 writing for the First Circuit
panel, noted that “a jury could reasonably conclude that Miller
meant that she felt badly for Chadwick because her life must have
been so difficult as the mother of three young children” and “that
Miller’s comment suggested pity rather than respect.”89 This,
together with additional remarks, convinced the appellate panel
that a jury could reasonably infer that the promotion was denied
based on an assumption that as a woman with four small children,
Chadwick would not “give her all to her job.”90 The appellate court
also found it significant that Miller learned of the children just two
months before denying Chadwick the promotion.91
Second, during Chadwick’s interview for the promotion, one of
the interviewers made an explicit reference to Chadwick’s
parenthood.92 In reacting to Chadwick’s answer to a question about
supervising employees who failed to meet deadlines, the
interviewer said, “Laurie, you are a mother [sic] would you let your
kids off the hook that easy, if they made a mess in [their] room,
would you clean it or hold them accountable?”93 District Judge
Hornby again saw no sex stereotyping, because the same question
could have been asked of a father.94 Doing so implicitly chose an
inference that the interviewer was thinking of parents generally

87. Id. at 145.
88. See Norman Stahl, BALLOTPEDIA, https://perma.cc/TFC5-RWJK (last
visited Sept. 25, 2019) (providing background on Judge Stahl) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Judge Stahl was appointed to the First Circuit
to replace Justice David Souter when the latter was appointed to the U.S.
Supreme Court. Id.
89. Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 47 n.10 (1st Cir. 2009).
90. Id.
91. See id. at 47 (“The young age and unusually high number of children
would have been more likely to draw the decisionmaker’s attention and
strengthen any sex-based concern she had that a woman with young children
would be a poor worker.”).
92. Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 2d 140, 143 (D. Me. 2008).
93. Id.
94. See id. at 145 (“It may not have been good business judgment for the
interviewer to relate home circumstances to the workplace, but it is not sex-based:
the principle and the question apply equally to discipline by a father.”).
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rather than thinking of women with children.95 Judge Stahl noted
but did not explicitly draw inferences from this question.96
Chadwick’s most significant circumstantial evidence consisted
of statements she alleged were made by Miller in explaining why
Chadwick was not chosen for the promotion.97 In the same
conversation, Miller told Chadwick that “if [the three interviewers]
were in your position, they would feel overwhelmed.”98 WellPoint
took the position that the real reason Chadwick was denied the
promotion was that she interviewed badly, and that Miller was just
trying to offer a less hurtful reason for rejection.99 Judge Hornby
recognized that the remark reflected discrimination against
caregivers, but again would not recognize as reasonable an
inference that it was based on sex:
If the case went to a jury on this record, the jury would have to
speculate in order to reach a conclusion that Miller stereotyped
working mothers and that she treated working mothers of
young children worse than (given the opportunity) she would
treat working fathers of young children. . . . Might Miller
harbor such stereotypes? Yes; the jury might well suspect it. But
suspicion is not enough; despite what might be the popular
95. Id.
96. See Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 42 (noting only that the district court
concluded the comment can apply to a mother or a father).
97. See id. at 47 (“It was nothing you did or didn’t do. It was just that you’re
going to school, you have kids and you just have a lot on your plate right now.”).
98. Id. at 42.
99. Chadwick, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 143. Miller so testified at her deposition,
but in the summary judgment context both courts recognized that a jury, whose
job it is to assess credibility, could choose to disbelieve her testimony. See
Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 47 (“A jury could reasonably question the veracity of this
[Miller’s] second explanation . . . .”); Chadwick, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 145 n.10 (“[A]
jury could disbelieve [Miller’s] explanation and find it pretextual.”). As the court
of appeals noted, Miller explained the non-promotion in one way to Chadwick
(that she had too much on her plate with her kids and school) and in a very
different way in her deposition (that Chadwick had performed poorly in her
interviews). A jury could reasonably question the veracity of this second
explanation given that Chadwick was an in-house, long-time employee who had
worked closely with her interviewers, had received stellar performance reviews,
and was already performing some of the key tasks of the Team Lead position. A
jury could rightly question whether brief interviews would actually trump
Chadwick’s apparently weighty qualifications, or whether, given the other
circumstantial evidence discussed above, Chadwick was really passed over
because of sex-based stereotypes. Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 47–48.
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intuition about what Miller meant, I conclude that her use of
sexual stereotypes cannot be shown by a preponderance of the
evidence on this record.100

For this judge, the missing link was something more specific
proving that a man with four young children would not have been
treated the same way, and he characterized Chadwick’s evidence
as merely prevalent stereotypes plus a “sexually ambiguous
utterance.”101 The plaintiff’s superior qualifications, the series of
remarks, and the background of societal stereotyping were not
enough to make an inference sufficiently believable compared to
other possibilities.102
Compare that to Judge Stahl’s opinion for the First Circuit,
looking at the same record and applying the same standard of
proof.103 It paid far more attention to the statement “it was nothing
you did or didn’t do,” the reference to “kids,” and the suggestion
that the interviewers imagined Chadwick would be
“overwhelmed.”104 Putting this conversation together with the
other circumstantial evidence (as read through the appellate
court’s inferences), this opinion required no explicit comparison to
males to infer that gender stereotypes, not just parenting
stereotypes, were at work:
Given the common stereotype about the job performance of
women with children and given the surrounding circumstantial
evidence presented by Chadwick, we believe that a reasonable
jury could find that WellPoint would not have denied a
promotion to a similarly qualified man because he had “too
much on his plate” and would be “overwhelmed” by the new job,
given “the kids” and his schooling.105

100. Chadwick, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 147 (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 147 n.15.
102. Id.
103. Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 2009).
104. Id. at 47.
105. Id. at 48. The opinion also noted the “parallel stereotypes presuming a
lack of domestic responsibilities for men.” Id. The First Circuit affirmed the trial
court’s decision to exclude a proposed plaintiff-side expert witness on sex
stereotyping, but it did so on the narrower ground of the expert’s lack of
knowledge about the facts of this particular case, a deficiency that presumably
could have been remedied on remand. See id. at 49 n.14 (“Rather, we understand
the district court to have concluded that Dr. Still could not offer information
helpful to a trier of fact due to her particular lack of familiarity with the details
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Once again, then, the courts’ opinions show an inference gap,
and one that cannot be explained by the record itself.106 Two judges
(the district judge and magistrate judge) found an inference of
sex-based discrimination so unlikely that summary judgment was
granted.107 Three judges (the First Circuit panel), reviewing the
case de novo, found that such an inference would be proper, so that
the case should go to the jury.108
B. Other Pretrial Rulings
Inferences that are contested but that end litigation are
especially troubling. But the same phenomenon of judges’ reliance
on arguable inferences also impacts non-dispositive pretrial
rulings. Many such decisions provide wide discretion for the trial
judge, and they are governed by general standards or multi factor
tests rather than strict rules.109 The decisions, though, will be
based on facts as the judge finds them, whether explicitly or
implicitly, consciously or subconsciously. Those forces create a
context in which the judge’s beliefs about “facts” can play a
powerful role when the governing standards are applied to them.110
of this case.”).
106. Id. at 47.
107. See Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 2d 140, 142 (D. Me. 2008)
(“I agree with the recommendation (although not all the reasoning) of the
magistrate judge, and GRANT the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.”).
108. See Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 48 (“In sum, we find that Chadwick has put
forth sufficient evidence of discrimination that a reasonable jury could conclude
that the promotion denial was more probably than not caused by
discrimination.”). On remand, the parties apparently settled the case in a way
that included a judgment for defendant on stipulated facts that resembled
defendants’ factual claims and that stipulates to a disagreement about what
Miller said to Chadwick. See Joint Motion as to Stipulated Facts and for Entry of
Final Judgment for Defendants at 5, Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 550 F. Supp.
2d 140 (D. Me. 2008) (No. 07-CV-70) (“The parties agree that Defendants’ decision
to award the position to Ouelette was not based upon gender or any sex based
stereotype.”). Chadwick still worked for WellPoint at the time of the stipulation.
Id. at 1.
109. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); Wittmann v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
No. CV 17-9501, 2018 WL 3374164, at *2 (E.D. La. July 11, 2018) (proportionality
factors for adjudicating protective orders).
110. See Chadwick, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 147 (believing that statements made
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In making these rulings the judge is finding the facts and not
merely deciding whether there is a genuine factual dispute for
later jury determination. Except in very limited circumstances, the
standard of proof for these pretrial rulings is the conventional
“preponderance of the evidence” standard: more likely than not.111
The judge is undertaking a comparative task in evaluating
information and reaching conclusions. And once again, it is the
mental exercise of finding some inference more believable that is
the source of differing outcomes. This section will highlight three

to plaintiff were not gender-based stereotypes, thus she could not maintain action
under Title VII).
111. See Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Fact, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 974
(2006) (noting the usual standard, and discussing the problems associated with
establishing jurisdictional facts by a preponderance of the evidence when they
relate to the underlying merits of the case).
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examples: two are disputes about discovery,112 and one relates to
class certification.113

112. Discovery relevance orders quite often turn on decisions about whether
the information sought would support an inference in favor of the party seeking
discovery. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 401(a) (“Evidence is relevant if . . . it has any tendency
to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence . . .”).
Balancing factors related to proportionality and requests for protective orders will
also turn on the court’s belief about underlying facts to be inferred. For example,
how important are the issues at stake; what amount is really in controversy; how
important is the requested discovery to resolution of the issues; what will the
benefit of the information be? See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (detailing proportionality
factors). Privilege decisions may turn on facts such as whether a document was
created in anticipation of litigation, whether a lawyer was acting in her capacity
as an attorney, or whether a communication was kept confidential, and many of
those decisions will be inferences from circumstantial evidence. See, e.g.,
Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 303, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(determining purpose of the attorney-client communication). Even managerial
decisions may turn on the judge’s beliefs about the strength of the inferential link
between discovery and legal claims, the motivations of parties and attorneys, and
the cost of discovery. For some recent examples of discovery decisions based on
inferences, see Wittmann v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. CV 17-9501, 2018 WL
3374164, at *2 (E.D. La. July 11, 2018) (inference from income sources to
allegations of conflict of interest); Shah v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 2:16-CV-1124,
2018 WL 2309595, at *10 (S.D. Ohio May 22, 2018) (inference from employee
rewards and bonuses to their handling of plaintiff’s disability claim); English v.
Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 323 F.R.D. 1, at *7 (D.D.C. 2017) (inferences
from bus driver’s pre-accident activities to negligence in driving and dragging
plaintiff under bus); Does I-XIX v. Boy Scouts of Am., No. 1:13-CV-00275, 2017
WL 3841902, at *3 (D. Idaho Sept. 1, 2017) (inference between content of Boy
Scout files and claims of misrepresentation and abuse); Bias v. Tangipahoa Par.
Sch. Bd., No. CV 12-2202, 2017 WL 679365, at *5 (E.D. La. Feb. 21, 2017)
(inference between plaintiff’s military records, transfer, and claim of retaliation
for filing False Claims Act suit); Centeno v. City of Fresno, No. 1:16-CV-00653,
2016 WL 7491634, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2016) (inference between prior
complaints about defendant officers and actions in current excessive force claim).
113. The requirements for class certification turn on fact findings, many of
which in turn are based on inferences. See, e.g., Menocal v. GEO Grp., 882 F.3d
905, 918 (10th Cir. 2018) (finding the predominance requirement for a 23(b)(3)
class action met when plaintiffs will be able to prove causation through class-wide
inference); Ark. Teachers Ret. Sys. v. Goldman Sachs Grp., 879 F.3d 474, 483 (2d
Cir. 2018) (recognizing that “fraud on the market” theory is a presumption that
an inference can be drawn); Waggoner v. Barclays PLC, 875 F.3d 79, 89 (2d Cir.
2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1702 (2018) (discussing factors from which inference
of efficient market may be drawn); Rikos v. Procter & Gamble Co., 799 F.3d 497,
512–13 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding that materiality of misrepresentations could
support an inference of reliance for entire class).
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1. Relevance and Protective Orders: Cazorla v. Koch Foods of
Mississippi, LLC114
Hispanic employees of Koch Foods, a poultry processor,
alleged that they were subjected to harassment and abuse on the
job.115 Koch, on the other hand, claimed that the employees had
made up the allegations in order to get U visas, which are available
to abuse victims who assist in government investigations.116
Those opposing positions led to a discovery dispute: the
company sought discovery of any information related to the
employees’ U visa applications.117 The plaintiffs objected, arguing
that the discovery would reveal to Koch the immigration status of
any applicants and their families, creating risks of job loss and
deportation.118 The magistrate judge and district judge allowed U
visa-related discovery but entered a protective order prohibiting
certain uses of the information.119 The Fifth Circuit vacated the
trial court’s order.120
Koch Foods operates a large poultry plant in Morton,
Mississippi, and the dispute underlying this lawsuit arose out of
allegations about harassment in the room where approximately
eighty-five employees debone and package chicken thighs.121 The
workers in this room were almost all Hispanic, most were illiterate
and spoke little English, and many were undocumented.122 Here
are the workers’ allegations, as summarized by the Fifth Circuit:
Koch supervisors allegedly groped female workers, and in some
cases assaulted them more violently; offered female workers
money or promotions for sex; made sexist and racist comments;
114. No. 3:10cv135, 2014 WL 12639863 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 22, 2014), vacated,
838 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2016).
115. Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 544.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Cazorla, 2014 WL 12639863, at *5–6. For reasons relating to statutory
interpretation, the discovery order was certified for interlocutory review. Cazorla,
838 F.3d at 548 n.16.
120. See Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 564 (“Rather than impose an order of our own,
we remand to the district court to devise an approach to U visa discovery that
adequately protects the diverse and competing interests at stake.”).
121. Id. at 544.
122. Id.
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punched, elbowed, and otherwise physically abused workers of
both sexes; and demanded money from them in exchange for
permission for bathroom breaks, sick leave, and transfers to
other positions . . . . When workers complained or resisted, Koch
managers allegedly ignored them, and some debone supervisors
allegedly retaliated by docking their pay; demoting,
reassigning, or firing them; and threatening to physically harm
them or have them arrested or deported.123

Ten workers filed the first claims with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in 2009, and they and a few
more followed up with lawsuits in 2010 and 2011.124 Meanwhile in
2010, the EEOC launched its own investigation, found reasonable
cause to believe a violation had occurred, and filed its own suit
identifying a class of about fifty to seventy-five individuals.125 The
cases were consolidated, and several additional employees
intervened in the EEOC’s suit.126
Koch denied the allegations, arguing that all of the
complainants made up their charges to qualify for improved
immigration status under the federal U visa program.127 That
denial defense led to the discovery requests at issue here.128 The
claimants requested a protective order under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(c), arguing that the information sought was not
relevant, and that even if it was relevant, the benefit of the
information to Koch was outweighed by the harm that compliance
would cause to the claimants and others.129
123. Id. at 544–45.
124. Id. at 545. Those first lawsuits were stayed while the EEOC charges were
being resolved. Id.
125. Id. at 545–46.
126. Id. at 546.
127. Id. at 545. The U visa program offers four years of nonimmigrant status
to qualifying individuals and their family members and allows them to apply for
green cards. Id. (citation omitted). Those with pending U visa applications may
also attain work authorization. Id. The program is available to victims of
substantial physical or mental abuse who aid a law enforcement agency in
investigating the alleged offenses. Id. That agency must certify that the applicant
is aiding the investigation, and the U.S. Customs and Immigration Service
(USCIS) must conduct its own de novo review of relevant evidence and confirm
the victim’s eligibility. Id.
128. Id. at 547.
129. Id. at 546.
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The magistrate judge, district judge,130 and Fifth Circuit panel
all addressed the same balancing test in evaluating the
defendant’s discovery request and plaintiffs’ request for a
protective order: did the potential relevance of the U visa
information outweigh the in terrorem effect of revealing that
immigration-relevant information to Koch? In making that
decision, the trial level judges and Fifth Circuit judges differed in
their factual beliefs about both relevance and the fears held by
immigrant populations.131
Implementation of the Rule 26(c) balancing test required
subsidiary fact finding in order to determine the extent of
relevance and harm.132 At the trial level, with respect to relevance,
the magistrate judge and district judge found the complainants’
credibility to be a central issue and the immigration information
highly relevant to assessing it.133 Those judges concurred with
Koch’s argued inference that the existence of an “exponential
jump” or “spike” in claims after the EEOC became involved,134
coupled with applications for U visas, was relevant to the issue of

130. See Daniel P. Jordan III, BALLOTPEDIA, https://perma.cc/EBP6-ZMET
(last visited Sept. 16, 2019) (providing background on Judge Jordan) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
131. In considering many discovery disputes, the court is using the
information at hand to predict what will happen in the future rather than
assessing the comparative probability of past events. Id. Nevertheless, the factors
that underlie discovery orders are very fact-based. Id. At the trial level, “[t]he
court’s responsibility, using all the information provided by the parties, is to
consider these and all the other factors in reaching a case-specific determination
of the appropriate scope of discovery.” FED R. CIV. P. 26(c) advisory committee’s
note to 2015 amendment.
132. See FED R. CIV. P. 26(c) (requiring a proportionality calculation that
weighs the potential benefit against the harms).
133. See Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., LLC, No. 3:10cv135, 2014 WL
12639863, at *5–6 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 22, 2014) (using the “clearly erroneous” or
“contrary to law” standard of review to defer to the magistrate judge even at the
trial level (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a))). With minor exceptions, the district
judge approved of the magistrate judge’s order. Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss.,
LLC, 838 F.3d 540, 564 (5th Cir. 2016)
134. See Cazorla, 2014 WL 12639863, at *5 (stating only eight people initially
filed claims with the EEOC, while in its Third Amended Complaint the EEOC
identified 115 claimants, 44 of whom were women who claimed to have been
sexually harassed and the rest of whom claimed some other kind of harassment
or injury).
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the claimants’ credibility and thus to the truth of the underlying
claims.135
With respect to prejudice if discovery were allowed, the trial
judges refused to infer from the claimants’ immigration and
employment situation that being forced to reveal the U visa
applications to Koch would have an in terrorem effect on the
claimants themselves or on others who might find themselves in a
similar situation.136 First, the trial judges found none of the named
plaintiffs work for Koch anymore, so they would not fear being
fired.137 Further, inferred the trial judges, claimants who had
applied for U visas had already revealed to federal immigration
authorities that they were not properly in the United States, so
even if Koch reported them to immigration officials there could be
no additional harm.138 At the trial level then, the judges
discounted the claimants’ statements of their own subjective fears
and did not infer future harm from disclosure to Koch.139
The Fifth Circuit judges, in an opinion written by Judge
Patrick Higginbotham,140 might well not have vacated the order
based only on private interests, given the very deferential “abuse
of discretion” standard of review.141 They did agree that the
135. See id. (agreeing with Koch Foods that “given the spike in
claims . . . coupled with the information provided in camera, there is a sufficient
basis to find relevance”).
136. See id. (determining that the plaintiff’s in terrorem argument is based on
a far broader interpretation of the Magistrate Judge’s order than its narrow
application and carries less weight than the probative value of the discovery).
137. See id. at *6 n.8 (“Even as to the other aggrieved individuals, it appears
that a small number remain employed, and some of them may have other
protection. Those that do not could be addressed in a protective order.”).
138. Id.
139. See id. (judging claimants’ arguments as holding very little weight with
regard to the in terrorem effects of the discovery at issue).
140. See Patrick Higginbotham, BALLOTPEDIA, https://perma.cc/X2JA-M4RX
(last visited Aug. 29, 2019) (providing general information on Judge
Higginbotham) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
141. See Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Mississippi, LLC, 838 F.3d 540, 547 (5th
Cir. 2016). As the Fifth Circuit opinion notes, the trial court will be found to have
abused its discretion in balancing only “when a relevant factor that should have
been given significant weight is not considered; when an irrelevant or improper
factor is considered and given significant weight; and when all proper factors, and
no improper ones, are considered, but the court, in weighing those factors,
commits a clear error of judgment.” Id. (quoting Kern v. TXO Prod. Corp., 738
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information sought was relevant for purposes of impeachment.142
But their inferences were different. For example, the Fifth Circuit
found that the “spike in claims” number, on its own, was “not
particularly suggestive of mass fraud.”143 Instead, for example,
“the EEOC may have discovered additional harassment claimants
during the pre-suit conciliation and investigation processes.”144
The appellate judges relied on information about statutory
provisions that deter false U visa claims,145 and also cited evidence
suggesting a pattern of abuse of immigrant workers in the poultry
industry.146
Other differences relate to the “prejudice” side of the balancing
test. The appellate judges inferred that disclosure of the U visa
information would cause significant harm, both to the individual
claimants and to their family members.147 With respect to
employment, the Fifth Circuit judges believed that the evidence
showed “a risk that U visa discovery will cause some claimants or
family members to lose their jobs.”148 Nor did the appellate judges
conclude that disclosure to U visa processors removed fear of all
immigration consequences.149 Instead, it found that:
F.2d 968, 970 (8th Cir. 1984)). A finding of abuse of discretion could thus be based
on the evidence considered rather than the inference itself. Id. at 547.
Nevertheless, as discussed above, the Fifth Circuit opinion in this case reveals
that its inferences differ from those of the trial court. See generally id.
142. Id. at 558.
143. See id. (stating that any number of explanations could explain the
increase in claims beside fraud alone).
144. Id.
145. See id. (“We further note that the U visa process contains numerous
protections against fraud, which should deter claimants from lying in their U visa
applications and the EEOC from abetting applications that it knows or suspects
to be fraudulent.”). See also id. at 558 n.57 (“It is USCIS that has the power to
grant each application, and it does so only after a de novo review of all the relevant
evidence. . . . USCIS can revoke U visas and initiate deportation proceedings if
application fraud is uncovered.”) (citations omitted).
146. See id. at 558 n.59 (citing numerous sources to demonstrate workplace
abuse in the poultry industry).
147. Id. at 559–62.
148. Id. at 560.
149. See id. at 561 (“[T]he claimants might fear that Koch will violate the
order and turn them in anyway. And employers commonly and unlawfully
retaliate against irksome workers by reporting or threatening to report them to
immigration authorities. A protective order would not necessarily quell claimants’
fear . . . .”).
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An abuse victim might well be willing to disclose sensitive
information to a few sympathetic officials, yet nonetheless fear
that his or her abuser might obtain that information and spread
it far and wide. . . . [T]heir having submitted U visa applications
does not rule out an in terrorem effect from further
disclosure.150

The factual disagreement about the impact of disclosure once
again comes from a difference in which facts the different judges
chose to consider as well as the inferences to be drawn from them.
In addition to discovery’s potential impact on the complainants,
Judge Higginbotham’s opinion considered the harm that disclosure
would cause to the enforcement efforts of the EEOC, amicus
National Labor Relations Board, and law enforcement agencies
nationwide, finding that disclosure would deter immigrant victims
of abuse, thereby frustrating Congress’s purpose in creating the U
visa program.151
Putting all of those factual conclusions together (lesser
relevance, stronger individual harm, and very strong societal harm
that had not been considered by the trial court), the Fifth Circuit
vacated the trial level discovery order and remanded for further
proceedings.152

150. Id.
151. See id. at 562–63
Allowing U visa discovery from the claimants themselves in this
high-profile case will undermine the spirit, if not the letter, of those
Congressionally sanctioned assurances and may sow confusion over
when and how U visa information may be disclosed, deterring
immigrant victims of abuse—many of whom already mistrust the
government—from stepping forward and thereby frustrating
Congress’s intent in enacting the U visa program.
152. In 2018, the EEOC and Koch Foods entered into a $3.75 million consent
decree that also included actions to prevent future violations. See Mica Rosenberg
& Kristina Cooke, Allegations of Labor Abuses Dogged Mississippi Plant Years
Before Immigration Raids, REUTERS (Aug. 9, 2019, 10:40 AM),
https://perma.cc/SCV2-98ZL (last visited Sept. 3, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). In August of 2019, this Koch Foods plant was
one of the targets of a massive immigration sweep by U.S. Customs and
Immigration Enforcement. Id.
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2. Relevance and Burden: Kuttner v. Zaruba153

This discovery dispute arose out of an employment
discrimination case.154 The difference in inferences here are found
in disagreements on appeal between the majority opinion of Judges
Sykes and Easterbrook, and the dissent written by Judge
Posner.155
Plaintiff Susan Kuttner worked for the DuPage County
Sheriff’s office beginning in 1998.156 In 2010, she was fired based
on a claim that she had worn (at least part of) her uniform while
trying to collect a loan for her boyfriend.157 She visited the debtor’s
home, spoke to his father (the debtor himself was not at home), and
left her business card.158 Kuttner admitted to violating two rules:
“conduct unbecoming” an officer and improper wearing of her
uniform, and as a result Sheriff Zaruba fired her.159 Kuttner filed
a sex discrimination suit, alleging that male deputies had received
less severe punishment for more severe violations on a number of
occasions.160
Kuttner sought to discover the personnel files of thirty named
deputies who she believed had violated department policies.161 The
trial judge limited that discovery to incidents after January 1, 2006
and to charges involving abuse of authority.162 Toward the end of
the discovery period, the judge also refused to allow Kuttner’s
lawyer to ask questions during deposition about what deponents
153. 819 F.3d 970 (7th Cir. 2016).
154. See id. at 971–72 (describing the facts at the lower court and the gender
discrimination allegation).
155. Compare id. at 973 (finding that without temporal restriction, discovery
of incidents before 2008 would lead to an unjustified fishing expedition by the
majority), with id. at 977 (Posner, J., dissenting) (arguing that the twenty-one
purported incidents alleged by Kuttner were relevant discovery necessary to
determining the case on its merits).
156. Id. at 972 (majority opinion).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 973.
162. See id. (“Following a hearing, the judge concluded that Kuttner’s
discovery requests were overly broad and unduly burdensome because they
lacked any time limitation and were based on ‘an overbroad definition of
‘similarity’ of misconduct.’”).
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had heard about violations, limiting the inquiry to the deponent’s
personal knowledge of infractions.163 Operating under those
limitations, Kuttner was unable to convince the trial judge that
un-fired male deputies’ conduct was comparable, and Sheriff
Zaruba was granted summary judgment.164
On appeal, a split Seventh Circuit panel affirmed.165 Judge
Sykes,166 writing for the majority, held that the district judge had
not abused his discretion in denying discovery.167 The majority
found that the passage of time made inferences that comparable
male deputies had not been as severely disciplined too attenuated
to be relevant.168 The decision not to include the first seven years
of Kuttner’s employment “served to hone in on possible
comparators who were reasonably likely to have been subject to
the same rules, supervisors, and decision making process as
Kuttner.”169 Having affirmed the denial of discovery, the majority
also affirmed the grant of summary judgment.170 Finding only
infractions involving “improper projection of coercive police
authority in service of a personal end” to be sufficiently similar to
justify an inference of discrimination, the majority rejected the
four post-2006 examples Kuttner brought to light (the discovery
order had made evidence of other infractions unavailable).171
163. Id. Kuttner’s lawyer asked Deputy Tara Campbell “whether she had ever
heard or seen any deputy violate any Sheriff’s Office policy or procedure.” Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 977.
166. See Diane Sykes, BALLOTPEDIA, https://perma.cc/4X5A-2JG7 (last visited
Sept. 3, 2019) (providing general information on Judge Sykes) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Judge Sykes was on President Donald
Trump’s list of twenty-five potential Supreme Court nominees to replace Justice
Anthony Kennedy on the Supreme Court. Id.
167. See Kuttner v. Zaruba, 819 F.3d 970, 974 (7th Cir. 2016) (“This standard
requires us to affirm unless the judge’s ruling lacks a basis in law or fact or clearly
appears to be arbitrary.”).
168. See id. at 973−74 (giving less weight to plaintiff’s offer of comparators).
169. Id. at 974. But see id. at 979 (Posner, J., dissenting) (“[T]he sheriff’s
lawyer acknowledged that nothing had changed in 2006, and so there was no
reason to ignore the earlier misconduct, which was the critical evidence of
discriminatory treatment of the plaintiff.”).
170. Id. at 977 (majority opinion).
171. See id. at 976–77
That’s what differentiates Kuttner’s misconduct from . . . Deputy
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Judge Posner,172 on the other hand, would have found the
denied discovery about other employees to be not merely relevant
but also so significant that the trial court’s action required
reversal.173 Kuttner listed twenty-one examples in her complaint,
and Judge Posner highlighted ten of them, including sexual
misdeeds, abuse of power, and domestic violence, some committed
while in uniform.174
In Judge Posner’s view, all of these officers’ misconduct (none
of which resulted in firing) were at least as serious as the plaintiff’s
actions and, because of inferences of discrimination that could
result from the comparison, relevant for purposes of discovery.175
He wrote, “[i]t is a virtual certainty that the plaintiff was
disciplined far more harshly than male counterparts who engaged
in far more egregious conduct—far more harshly because she’s a
woman. The DuPage County Sheriff’s Office is or at least was a
boy’s club.”176
Note, then, the difference in decisions about what the
information sought might be able to show. Judge Sykes’s majority
opinion wanted to see specific parallels in time and circumstances
before the trial court could draw an inference of
discrimination-based disparate treatment.177 Under this view of
the potential probative value (relevance) of other incidents, the
Morgan’s allowing his girlfriend to wear his uniform to a Halloween
party or making two personal visits to a female inmate in the jail. In
Deputy Morgan’s case, there were no allegations of coercion by the use
or appearance of legal authority.
172. See Richard Posner, BALLOTPEDIA, https://perma.cc/25FP-5QD3 (last
visited Sept. 3, 2019) (providing general information on Judge Posner) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
173. See Kuttner, 819 F.3d at 980 (Posner, J., dissenting) (describing the
majority as stymying a “promising” case of sex discrimination through an
“arbitrary cut-off date” and the hearsay bar).
174. See id. at 978–79 (listing numerous salacious and disturbing details from
allegations known to Kuttner). Judge Posner further pointed to evidence that no
changes had been made to department policy to render the list of accusations
moot. Id.
175. See id. at 979–80 (arguing that the severity of the allegations
necessitated thorough discovery and that the allegations ultimately would have
led to a successful claim for Kuttner).
176. Id. at 980.
177. See id. at 974 (majority opinion) (“[R]estricting the time period . . . served
to hone in on possible comparators who were reasonably likely to have been
subject to the same rules, supervisors, and decision-making process as Kuttner.”).
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denial of discovery was supported by the facts.178 Judge Posner, on
the other hand, thought the trial court should have found the
information relevant because a wider array of disciplinary
decisions could form the basis for an inference of discrimination.179
3. Class Certification: Mielo v. Steak ‘n Shake Operations, Inc.180
This putative class action against Steak ‘n Shake alleged that
the company violated Title III of the Americans with Disabilities
Act181 (ADA) because their parking lots were not fully accessible to
and independently usable by individuals who use wheelchairs or
were otherwise mobility disabled.182 This time, the trial court
reached a plaintiff-friendly result, and the court of appeals
reversed.183 In the trial court, Magistrate Judge Robert C.
Mitchell184 certified a broadly defined class.185
178. See id. at 976 (“The district judge concluded that Kuttner failed to satisfy
the prima facie requirements because she did not identify any similarly situated
male employee who received more favorable treatment.”).
179. See id. at 980 (Posner, J., dissenting) (“The combination of the arbitrary
cut-off date and the discovery hearsay bar was fatal to a promising case of
disparate treatment based on gender. And ‘promising’ is an understatement.”).
180. No. 15-180, 2017 WL 1519544 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2017), rev’d, 897 F.3d
467 (3d Cir. 2018).
181. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181–12189 (2018).
182. See Mielo, 2017 WL 1519544, at *1 (stating that two disability rights
advocates, both disabled themselves, sued on behalf of all disabled persons who
had had difficulty with Steak ‘n Shake parking lots).
183. Compare id. at *9 (finding that plaintiffs sufficiently met their burden
for certifying a class), with Mielo v. Steak ‘n Shake Operations, Inc., 897 F.3d 467,
491 (3d Cir. 2018) (reversing the trial court by finding that plaintiffs’ class did not
meet the standards of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23).
184. See Robert C. Mitchell, BALLOTPEDIA, https://perma.cc/PY8S-Q8HT (last
visited Sept. 4, 2019) (providing general information on Judge Mitchell) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
185. See Mielo, 2017 WL 1519544, at *7
[T]he following Class is certified: All persons with qualified mobility
disabilities who were or will be denied the full and equal enjoyment of
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations of
any Steak ‘n Shake restaurant location in the United States on the
basis of a disability because such persons encountered accessibility
barriers at any Steak ‘n Shake restaurant where Defendant owns,
controls and/or operates the parking facilities.
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The Third Circuit, in an opinion written by Chief Judge D.
Brooks Smith,186 based its reversal in part on a disagreement
about the class certification requirement of numerosity, which in
turn was based on the judges’ different views of inferences.187
While there is no exact number that satisfies numerosity, courts
generally state that approximately forty class members are
enough.188 Under Third Circuit precedent, class certification “calls
for a rigorous analysis in which ‘[f]actual determinations
supporting Rule 23 findings must be made by a preponderance of
the evidence.’”189 So, what was the evidence that did or did not
support an inference that the class was so numerous that joinder
would be impracticable?
The trial court was persuaded that the numerosity
requirement was met by these pieces of information: 1) census data
showing that there are between 14.9 million to 20.9 million persons
with mobility disabilities who live in the United States;190 2) the
statement of a Steak ‘n Shake executive that “thousands of people
with disabilities utilize [Steak ‘n Shake] parking lots . . . each
year”;191 3) plaintiffs’ identification of eight locations in
186. See Brooks Smith, BALLOTPEDIA, https://perma.cc/L249-JD5F (last
visited Sept. 4, 2019) (providing general information on Judge Smith) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
187. The trial and appellate courts also disagreed about the commonality
requirement. Mielo, 897 F.3d at 487–90. The district court found the requirement
to be met based on the inferences from facts in the record: that Steak ‘n Shake
applied the same policies on parking lot access nationwide. Mielo, 2017 WL
1519544, at *6. Their disagreement, however, turned less on inferences and more
on breadth of the district court’s definition of the class, which could be read to
include all types of “accessibility barriers” despite the definition’s reference to
parking facilities. Id. at *7.
188. See Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 226–27 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[I]f the
named plaintiff demonstrates that the potential number of plaintiffs exceeds 40,
the first prong of Rule 23(a) has been met.”).
189. Mielo, 897 F.3d 483–84 (quoting In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust
Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 307 (3d Cir. 2009)). Not all circuits require proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Terrill v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc.,
295 F.R.D. 671, 682 (S.D. Ga. 2013) (using an “in fact” standard, rather than a
preponderance of the evidence standard).
190. Mielo, 2017 WL 1519544, at *5; see also Mielo, 897 F.3d at 486 (“Plaintiffs
point to census data showing that ‘there are between 14.9 million to 20.9 million
persons with mobility disabilities who live in the United States’”) (quoting
Appellee Brief at 41, Mielo, 897 F.3d 467 (No. 17-2678)).
191. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Class Certification at 9, Mielo,
No. 2:15-cv-00180, 2017 WL 1519544 (“[I]t would ‘be fair to say that thousands of
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Pennsylvania and Ohio with noncompliant parking lots;192 4) the
existence of more than 400 Steak ‘n Shake restaurants in the
United States potentially subject to the class’s claims;193 and 5) the
special difficulties that arose because the group of putative class
members “include[d] a potentially high number of individuals with
mobility disabilities from multiple states.”194 The plaintiffs urged
the court to use its “common sense” to conclude that the
numerosity requirement was satisfied, and it did so.195
The Third Circuit judges reached the opposite conclusion.196
Mentioning the census data and characterizing the executive
statement as a “single off-hand comment . . . speculating [about
numbers],” those judges believed that what the plaintiffs saw as
common sense was really “mere speculation.”197 Their opinion
states:
Plaintiffs’ first strand of evidence—indicating that there are
between 14.9 million to 20.9 million persons with mobility
disabilities who live in the United States—suggests that it is
highly likely that at least 40 of those individuals would have
experienced access violations at one of the Steak ‘n Shake
locations at issue in this litigation. But although those odds
might be enough for a good wager, we must be mindful that
“[m]ere speculation as to the number of class members—even if
such speculation is ‘a bet worth making’—cannot support a
finding of numerosity.”198

people with disabilities utilize th[e] parking spaces and visit Steak ‘n Shake stores
every year’” (quoting Duffner Deposition at 68:19–69:5)).
192. Mielo v. Steak ‘n Shake Operations, Inc., No. 15-180, 2017 WL 1519544,
at *1 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2017).
193. See id. at *6 (noting the restaurant chain’s pervasiveness).
194. See id. at *5 (describing joinder as particularly difficult given the
disabilities that impair plaintiffs’ ability to travel).
195. Compare Mielo v. Steak ‘n Shake Operations, Inc., 897 F.3d 467, 486 (3d
Cir. 2018) (“Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy their Rule 23(a)(1) burden.”), with
Mielo, 2017 WL 1519544, at *14–15 (coming to the opposite conclusion).
196. See Mielo, 897 F.3d at 491 (declining to follow the plaintiff’s “common
sense” logic).
197. Id. at 484.
198. Id. at 486 (emphasis added) (quoting Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725
F.3d 349, 357 (3d Cir. 2013)).
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Without more direct or specific evidence of the number of
disabled individuals who actually patronized a Steak ‘n Shake
restaurant and experienced an ADA violation there, the judges on
the Third Circuit found an inference of numerosity to be
unsupported by the evidence.199 Although it employed an abuse of
discretion standard of review,200 the court noted that plaintiffs
seeking class certification must prove the facts supporting the Rule
23(a) requirements by a preponderance of the evidence.201 The
existence of at least forty class members was not, to those judges,
more believable than a contrary inference.202
V. Judges and Heuristics
The hypothetical in Part III and real rulings in Part IV show
judges drawing different inferences based on the same underlying
facts. This Part will describe the empirical literature showing the
ways in which mental shortcuts (“heuristics”), which can vary with
individuals’ experiences and attitudes, may explain why inferences
can vary so dramatically from judge to judge. Not surprisingly, the
literature does not test all heuristics or all types of decisions, but
this sample shows that judges’ expertise does not usually protect
them from the operation of intuitive thought processes.
A. Introduction to Heuristics: Unconscious Shortcuts
Judges’ generalizations operate through the reasoning
mechanisms that human brains use. Like most cognition, judicial
199. The appellate panel’s decision may also have been influenced by its dim
view of the merits. See Mielo, 897 F.3d at 475 (“Despite the novelty of these
interpretations, Steak ‘n Shake has not yet filed a motion to dismiss or motion for
summary judgment.”).
200. Id. at 474.
201. See id. at 484 (“Although this strengthening of the numerosity inquiry
has sometimes been criticized, our precedent nonetheless demands that a court
‘make a factual determination, based on the preponderance of the evidence, that
Rule 23’s requirements have been met.’” (quoting Marcus v. BMW of N. Am.,
L.L.C., 687 F.3d 583, 596 (3d Cir. 2012))).
202. See id. at 487 (rejecting a finding of numerosity). The Third Circuit also
reviewed de novo the district judge’s legal framework, and rejected what it
characterized as his “when in doubt, certify the class” approach. Id. at 483–84.
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fact finding often happens under circumstances of incomplete
information and limited processing time.203 Psychologists use a
number of different labels to describe how humans think, but they
recognize distinct roles for intuition and deliberation.204 Intuitive
processes (System 1) operate quickly, often unconsciously, are
relatively effortless, and are susceptible to emotional influences.205
“System 1 is radically insensitive to both the quality and quantity
of the information that give rise to impressions and intuitions.”206
Deliberative processes (System 2), on the other hand, move more
slowly because they require conscious work and the application of
rules.207 The two systems interact, and the intuitive inferences,
which are automatically gathered, affect more deliberative
decisions in a number of ways.208 Despite the intervention of
System 2 thinking, the influence of System 1 rarely ceases.209
System 1 employs various heuristics to help make those quick
evaluations.210 Although accurate and helpful in many situations,
they can also lead to unreliable conclusions.211 Keep in mind that
203. See James R. Steiner-Dillon, Epistemic Exceptionalism, 52 IND. L. REV.
207, 230 (2019) (“The empirical literature on judicial susceptibility to cognitive
biases shows that judges’ training and experience leave them better prepared to
resist some forms of cognitive error, but on the whole, does not diverge from the
cognitive processes of laypersons . . . .”).
204. See Blinking, supra note 37, at 6–9 (discussing the judicial
decision-making process). As Guthrie notes, “[t]he convergence of psychologists
on the notion that two separate systems of reasoning coexist in the human brain
is remarkable.” Id. at 9 n.49; see also KAHNEMAN, supra note 9, at 4 (discussing
the mental process of impression, intuition, and decision).
205. See Blinking, supra note 37, at 7 (describing the qualities of System 1
intuitive processes).
206. KAHNEMAN, supra note 9, at 86.
207. See Blinking, supra note 37, at 7–8 (describing System 2 deliberate
processes).
208. See id. at 9 (detailing how System 1 processes and reacts to situations as
they arise, and System 2 analyzes the quality of decision making made by
intuition).
209. KAHNEMAN, supra note 9, at 85–86 (discussing how System 1 and System
2 interact even when systematically approaching evidence through System 2).
210. See Blinking, supra note 37, at 7 (describing System 1 as
“heuristic-based” (quoting KEITH E. STANOVICH & RICHARD F. WEST, Individual
Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate?, in HEURISTICS
AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 421, 436–38 (2002))).
211. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under
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System 1 heuristics operate automatically—these mental
processes are intuitive and powerful, affecting thought in a way
that is hidden from the conscious, deliberate System 2.212 Its
efficient operation also means that it does not keep track of
discarded possibilities—System 1 loves coherence and makes
available a collection of information that fits together and is
compatible with the person’s overall worldview.213
This subsection will highlight some of the heuristics that are
relevant to judicial inferences and whose impact on judges have
been studied.
Availability. We make judgments about how likely something
is based on how easily examples come to mind—how “available”
they are.214 That could be based on how many examples one has
encountered, and to that extent it is related to frequency, which is
related to probability. But it is also affected by other things that
make something “available” (i.e. memorable): things like dramatic
content, personal impact, and visual stimulation.215 The
availability heuristic can make people think sharks kill more
people than ponies, or that they are more likely to die from a
terrorist attack than from heart disease. The operation of the
availability heuristic for any particular individual will be
influenced by that person’s experiences, since they impact what
information is “available” to System 1’s quick search.216
Representativeness. The “representativeness” heuristic causes
people to estimate probability using the similarity of one thing to
the person’s mental image of the corresponding stereotype.217
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124–30 (1974)
[hereinafter Uncertainty] (discussing biases resulting from use of
representativeness heuristic, availability heuristic, and anchoring heuristic).
212. See supra notes 207–210 and accompanying text.
213. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 9, at 85 (“The measure of success for System
1 is the coherence of the story it manages to create.”).
214. See id. at 129 (“We defined the availability heuristic as the process of
judging frequency by ‘the ease with which instances come to mind.’”).
215. See id. at 130 (using examples such as plane crashes to demonstrate
events and experiences that would bias a person to believe such events are more
common than in actuality).
216. See id. (discussing “personal experiences, pictures, and vivid examples”
as examples of the availability heuristic).
217. See id. at 149 (describing the representativeness heuristic as ignoring
statistics and the veracity of a claim in favor of a bias that connects stereotypes
with a given outcome); Uncertainty, supra note 211, at 1124–25 (detailing
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When people rely on representativeness to make judgments, they
are likely to judge wrongly because the fact that something is more
representative does not actually make it more likely. The
representativeness heuristic can lead “to serious errors, because
similarity, or representativeness, is not influenced by several
factors that should affect judgments of probability.”218 For
example, it is insensitive to the accuracy (or lack thereof) of the
stereotype.219 And stereotypes are influenced by the person’s own
experiences and understanding of the way the world works.220
Confirmation. This heuristic is defined as “the seeking or
interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs,
expectations, or a hypothesis in hand.”221 It operates as part of
System 1 thinking.222 Confirmation bias leads people to find and
interpret information in a way that supports preexisting
hypotheses and to avoid information or interpretations that
support alternate possibilities.223 It can also take the form of giving
greater weight to information supporting a position one has taken
or remembering that supporting information more readily than
information that disconfirms the belief.224 This is particularly
common “in situations that are inherently complex and
ambiguous”—those that are “characterized by interactions among
numerous variables and in which the cause and effect

representativeness heuristics).
218. Uncertainty, supra note 211, at 1124.
219. See id. at 1124–25 (describing the “insensitivity to prior probability of
outcomes,” sample size, and predictability).
220. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 9, at 146–49 (discussing how stereotypes from
one’s own experiences influence a person toward certain beliefs and outcomes).
221. Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in
Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998).
222. See supra notes 205–213 and accompanying text (describing System 1
cognition).
223. See Nickerson, supra note 221, at 187 (“People are more likely to question
information that conflicts with preexisting beliefs than information that is
consistent with them and are more likely to see ambiguous information to be
confirming preexisting beliefs than disconfirming of them.”).
224. See id. at 191 (providing political examples where confirmation bias
involves “intentional selectivity in the use of information for the conscious
purpose of supporting a position”).
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relationships are obscure . . . .”225 Like the availability heuristic,
the operation of any particular person’s confirmation bias very
much turns on that person’s experience and view of “common
sense.”226
Affect. The affect heuristic leads people to decisions that are
consistent with their emotions.227 “Do I like it? Do I hate it? How
strongly do I feel about it?”228
Emotions influence how people perceive others, what they
remember about others, and how they process information
about others. Emotions guide “people’s attitudes, beliefs, and
inferential strategies” so that they see people they like as
having positive qualities and people they do not like as
possessing negative ones. Consequently, even deliberative
reasoning can be influenced by intuitive, emotional
reactions.229

System 2 is particularly ineffective in overcoming the affect
heuristic.230
Anchoring. When people estimate numerical values, they
often rely on an initial value available to them and adjust from
there—hence the anchor metaphor.231 This can be rational and
helpful.232 But it turns out that the heuristic is at play even when

225. Id. at 191–92.
226. See id. at 175 (defining confirmation bias as interpreting evidence partial
to one’s “existing beliefs” informed by one’s experience and view of what
constitutes “common sense”).
227. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 9, at 139 (“The affect heuristic is an instance
of substitution, in which the answer to an easy question (How do I feel about it?)
serves as an answer to a much harder question (What do I think about it?).”).
228. Id.
229. Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Heart Versus Head: Do Judges Follow the Law
or Follow Their Feelings?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 855, 869 (2015) [hereinafter Heart
Versus Head] (footnotes omitted) (quoting Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated
Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 493 (1990)).
230. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 9, at 103–04 (“In the context of
attitudes . . . System 2 is more of an apologist for the emotions of System 1 than
a critic of those emotions—an endorser rather than an enforcer.”).
231. See Uncertainty, supra note 211, at 1128–30 (“[D]ifferent starting points
yield different estimates, which are biased toward the initial values. We call this
phenomenon anchoring.”).
232. See id. at 1129 (noting that anchoring reduces mental effort but often
leads to errors).
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it makes no sense at all, such as when the number is unrelated to
the number to be estimated.233
Another form of anchoring is not about numbers.234 Everyday
social interactions (as well as judicial decisions) require humans to
infer the thoughts and feelings of other people. In order to figure
this out, people use themselves as a kind of “anchor” to estimate
the intent and emotions of others and adjust from there depending
on how similar or dissimilar from themselves the other person
seems to be.235 “For example, to infer another’s mental state, one
might first mentally imagine experiencing that person’s situation,
read off the evoked mental state, and then assume that the other
person would feel similarly.”236 This process, sometimes called
“self-referencing,” works very much like anchoring with
numbers.237
When people use themselves as an anchor point, if the other
person’s experiences are different, the inference will be unreliable
unless it is adjusted to account for dissimilarities.238 (The
adjustment may use System 2 deliberative thinking.)239 This can
work relatively well so long as the “other” is fairly similar and
sufficient adjustments are made. However, one study found that
when the “other” is not perceived as similar, the people doing the

233. See Judicial Mind, supra note 26, at 788 (describing an experiment in
which providing participants with a random number affected their estimates of
the percentage of the United Nations membership made up of African countries).
234. See generally Diana I. Tamir & Jason P. Mitchell, Anchoring and
Adjustment During Social Inferences, 142 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 151
(2013) [hereinafter Anchoring and Adjustment].
235. See id. (“Although humans cannot ever directly access the goings-on of
others’ minds, we can gain insight into the ways that others think or feel by
simulating their experience in our own mind.”).
236. Id.
237. See Hsiao H. D’Ailly, Harry G. Murray & Alice Corkill, Cognitive Effects
of Self-Referencing, 20 CONT. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 88, 88 (1995) (giving an overview of
self-referencing).
238. See id. (“[A] perceiver must have experiences that are relevant to those
of the social inference target. If this is not the case, a perceiver’s self-knowledge
likely will not apply to the target and so cannot provide an informative starting
point for understanding the target’s experience.”).
239. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 9, at 120 (“There is a form of anchoring that
occurs in a deliberate process of adjustment, an operation of System 2.”).
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inferring do not use self-referencing as an anchor.240 Instead, they
fall back on stereotypes.241
Hindsight. “[O]nce people know the outcome of an event, they
tend to overestimate what could have been anticipated in
foresight.”242 Experimenters have detected hindsight bias in a wide
array of situations, including “general-knowledge questions, in
political or business developments, in predictions of elections or
sport results, in medical diagnoses or in personality assessment,”
and more.243
Egocentric heuristics and biases. In addition to
self-referencing, a cluster of self-centered biases can also affect
judicial decisions. One is “egocentric bias,” a tendency to have a
higher opinion of oneself than reality would support.244 This can
make people overconfident in the accuracy of their opinions.245 A
second is the “false consensus effect,” in which people overestimate
the degree to which others agree with their beliefs, which also
creates overconfidence.246 Those biases are related to “naïve
realism,” the human tendency to believe that we see the world
around us objectively, and that people who disagree with us must
be uninformed, irrational, or biased.247 One consequence of naïve
240. See Anchoring and Adjustment, supra note 234, at 160 (noting the limits
of self-referencing).
241. For studies confirming this phenomenon in legal settings, see Richard L.
Wiener et al., Perceptions of Sexual Harassment: The Effects of Gender, Legal
Standard, and Ambivalent Sexism, 21 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 71 (1997); Jason A.
Cantone & Richard L. Weiner, Religion at Work: Evaluating Hostile Work
Environment Religious Discrimination Claims, 23 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 351
(2017).
242. IRESEARCHNET, https://perma.cc/P9RC-5WA5 (last visited Oct. 29, 2018)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
243. Id.
244. DANIEL L. SCHACTER ET AL., PSYCHOLOGY 254 (2d. ed. 2011).
245. See, e.g., Anna Sundström, Self-Assessment of Driving Skill: A Review
from a Measurement Perspective, 11 TRANSP. RES. PART F: TRAFFIC PSYCHOL. &
BEHAV. 1, 1 (2008) (explaining that a majority of respondents rate themselves
above average in driving skill and safety).
246. See Lee Ross et al., The “False Consensus Effect”: An Egocentric Bias in
Social Perception and Attribution Processes, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
279, 297 (1977) (explaining that such biases “both foster and justify the actor’s
feelings that his own behavioral choices are appropriate”).
247. Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Naive Realism in Everyday Life: Implications
for Social Conflict and Misunderstanding, in VALUES AND KNOWLEDGE 103,
110– 11 (T. Brown et al. eds., 1996).
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realism is referred to as the “bias blind spot,” which is the ability
to recognize cognitive and motivational biases in others while
failing to recognize the impact of bias on the self.248 Sadly, when
people form beliefs based on heuristics they may well be both
confident that the decisions are correct and unaware of the impact
of those heuristics on the decisions.249
B. Heuristics Affect Judicial Decisions
It would be tempting to believe that judges, because of their
high intelligence, extensive education, and professional experience
would not be subject to heuristic-based reasoning flaws. Sadly, this
is not true.250 Some of the evidence for that is circumstantial
research on other types of professional experts—including doctors,
real estate agents, psychologists, options traders, military leaders,
and auditors—showing that they rely on heuristic biases.251 Even
more tellingly, empirical studies of actual judges show that
heuristics influence judicial tasks.252
Many of the contemporary studies of trial court
decision-making have been done by the trio of Professors Jeff
Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie, and U.S. Magistrate Judge Andrew
Wistrich (hereinafter RGW).253 Overall, those studies of hundreds
248. Emily Pronin et al., The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self
Versus Others, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369, 374 (2002).
249. See id. at 378 (concluding that knowledge of biases “neither prevents one
from succumbing nor makes one aware of having done so”).
250. See Blinking, supra note 37, at 31 (finding that “heuristic-based decision
making” led to erroneous decisions); Judicial Mind, supra note 26, at 829
(asserting that judges make mistakes based on “cognitive illusions”).
251. See Judicial Mind, supra note 26, at 782–83 (referencing empirical
studies on many types of professionals); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Inside the
Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1229–30 (2006) [hereinafter
Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind] (identifying research focused on certain experts).
252. See Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, supra note 251, at 1230 (referencing a
study suggesting that bankruptcy judges “are susceptible to the ‘self-serving’ or
‘egocentric’ bias when making judgments”).
253. See Blinking, supra note 37, at 3 (noting the impact of heuristics);
Judicial Mind, supra note 26, at 780 (demonstrating that judges’ reliance on
heuristics “can create cognitive illusions that produce erroneous judgments”);
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1197 (2009) [hereinafter Unconscious Racial Bias]
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of federal and state judges show that “judges rely on heuristics that
can lead to systematically erroneous judgments.”254 Administering
a “cognitive reflection test” to judges showed that “judges tended
to favor intuitive rather than deliberative faculties.”255 That test,
however, asks questions unrelated to judging.256 Judicial task case
studies also showed that judges tend to be influenced by heuristics
such as anchoring, hindsight bias, and egocentric bias.257 Further,
tests showed that judges have difficulty deliberately disregarding
inadmissible evidence.258
To make this more concrete, consider some examples. First, in
order to test whether judges are affected by anchoring, one RGW
study presented participating judges with a hypothetical lawsuit
arising out of an automobile accident.259 The control group judges
were given the facts and asked “[h]ow much would you award the
plaintiff in compensatory damages?”260 Judges in the anchor group
were given identical information, but they were also told of a
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction arguing
that the amount in controversy was lower than the required
$75,000.01.261 Judges were asked to rule on the motion and then,
if they did not dismiss the case, asked the same question about
compensatory damages.262 The judges’ responses showed that the
(reporting results of “the first study of implicit racial bias among judges”);
Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, supra note 251, at 1230 (exploring whether
specialization influences the impact of heuristics on judges); Andrew J. Wistrich
et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately
Disregarding, 53 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1258 (2005) [hereinafter Can Judges Ignore
Inadmissible Information] (testing the ability of trial judges “to disregard
inadmissible information”); Heart Versus Head, supra note 229, at 862 (studying
whether judges’ feelings about litigants affect their decision making).
254. Judicial Mind, supra note 26, at 784.
255. Blinking, supra note 37, at 17.
256. See id. at 10 (describing the Cognitive Reflection Test).
257. Id. at 19–27.
258. See Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information, supra note 253, at
1264–70 (noting that even inadmissible evidence that is deliberately avoided can
indirectly influence judgment).
259. Blinking, supra note 37, at 20.
260. Id. at 21.
261. Id.
262. Because the plaintiff as described clearly had incurred damages
exceeding $75,000, the researchers regarded the motion to dismiss as meritless,
and only two out of 116 judges would have granted it. Id.
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$75,000 served as an anchor: judges who had not ruled on the
motion (i.e. no anchor) awarded the plaintiff an average of
$1,249,000, but judges who had been exposed to the motion
awarded the plaintiff an average of only $882,000.263 The
difference was statistically significant; the average award of the
anchor group was thirty percent lower.264 “The anchor triggered
intuitive, automatic processing that the judges were unable to
override.”265 The judges’ inferences about damages were influenced
by the anchor.266
A test of hindsight bias informed judges about the outcome on
appeal of a case involving Rule 11 sanctions.267 The judges were all
given the same fact pattern, except that they were given one of
three different appellate outcomes.268 They were then asked, in
light of the fact pattern and all three possible outcomes, which of
the outcomes had been the most likely.269 In each case, judges
found the outcome they had originally been given to be
significantly more likely.270 “Learning an outcome clearly
influenced the judges’ ex post assessments of the ex ante likelihood
of various possible outcomes. The intuitive notion that the past
was predictable prevailed.”271
263. See id. (showing the power of anchoring).
264. See Judicial Mind, supra note 26, at 791 (displaying the statistical proof
of the effect of anchoring).
265. Blinking, supra note 37, at 21.
266. In another hypothetical, judges were either told of a $10 million
settlement demand or just told that the plaintiff “was intent upon collecting a
significant monetary payment.” Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information,
supra note 253, at 1288 n.150. The $10 million acted as a high anchor, resulting
in a significant increase in the judges’ damage awards despite otherwise identical
fact patterns. Id. at 1288–92.
267. See Blinking, supra note 37, at 24–25 (outlining facts in a hypothetical
in which the district court found “that the plaintiff knew his claims were not
actionable because he had made similar claims several years earlier in a case that
had been dismissed by the trial court”).
268. See id. at 25 (“Each judge randomly received one of three conditions:
‘Affirmed,’ ‘Vacated,’ or ‘Lesser Sanction.’”).
269. Id.
270. See id. at 25–26 (finding that a large percentage of judges in each group
asserted that they would have predicted the outcome).
271. Id. at 26. However, in another test of hindsight bias the judges were not
affected by learning about the fruits of an arguably illegal search. See infra note
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In an RGW study designed to test judges’ ability to disregard
inadmissible evidence, both control group and “suppression”
judges were given information about available evidence in a
contract dispute between Jones, a freelance consultant, and
SmithFilms, a movie studio.272 The hypothetical lawsuit turned on
whether Smith, the studio owner, had offered Jones “producer
credit.”273 Jones claimed that he had; the studio denied it.274 The
only writing in the case was a short letter specifying that Jones
would receive “other consideration as agreed upon by the parties
during the pre-signing breakfast.”275 To corroborate his own
testimony, Jones offered the testimony of a waitress who said she
overheard a mention of producer credit.276 Smith was in a coma (!),
so SmithFilms could offer only testimony that SmithFilms did not
generally offer producer credit.277
Both groups of judges were given this description and asked
whether they would rule for Jones or SmithFilms.278 But the judges
assigned to the “suppression” group first had to rule on the
admissibility of an audiotape of a post-negotiation conversation
between Jones and his attorney, with Jones objecting that the tape
was protected by the attorney-client privilege (and under the facts
of the hypothetical, that was the more likely conclusion).279 On the
tape, Jones admits that he had not actually asked for the producer
credit, and there was no such agreement.280 Although the judges
otherwise had identical information, the judges’ awareness of the
plaintiff’s admission significantly decreased his win rate.281 “In the
310 and accompanying text.
272. Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information, supra note 253, at
1294– 95.
273. Id. at 1294.
274. Id. at 1295.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1335.
277. See id. at 1295 (describing testimony that served as the basis for the
hypothetical).
278. Id. at 1296.
279. See id. at 1295 (framing the issue as whether Jones was seeking legal
advice or business advice).
280. See id. (“Jones: I really needed this deal and I was afraid that asking for
producer credit might be a turn-off, so I got nervous and did not ask for it.”).
281. See id. at 1296 (noting the effect of a slight change in fact on the
hypothetical plaintiff’s win rate).
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control condition [no tape], 55.6% (25 out of 45) of the judges found
for the plaintiff. . . . Among those who ruled that the audiotape was
privileged, only 29.2% (7 out of 24) found for the plaintiff.”282 Even
judges who had ruled the tape out of bounds, then, let the
knowledge they gained from the tape influence the inferences on
which they based their judgments.283
The RGW researchers also examined whether judges were
subject to the affect heuristic, using a number of hypotheticals on
hundreds of judges over a period of years.284 While judges no doubt
strive to avoid the influence of emotions or non-merits values on
their decisions, the results again show the impact of intuitive
processes.285 For example, the researchers gave a problem
involving illegal immigration to 508 judges.286 The judges were told
that they were presiding over the prosecution of an immigrant
illegally in the country.287 The defendant was a Peruvian citizen
who pasted a forged U.S. entry visa into his legitimate Peruvian
passport.288 The judges were told that the defendant was charged
with “forging an identification card,”289 and given the language of
the relevant statute. The statute’s application to these facts was
open to interpretation.290
The judges were divided into two groups.291 One was told that
the defendant was a killer who had been hired by a drug cartel to
sneak into the U.S. to “track down someone who had stolen drug

282. Id.
283. See id. at 1297 (recognizing that the evidence, even while inadmissible,
influenced the judges).
284. See Heart Versus Head, supra note 229, at 874 (noting that data was
collected from 2008 to 2013 using a written questionnaire with three to five
hypothetical cases).
285. See id. at 911 (providing statistical results).
286. See id. at 877 (including 100 federal trial judges from a variety of
districts, eighty state and federal appellate judges, eighty-six newly appointed
New York trial judges, and 242 Ohio judges).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. See id. (discussing the issue of “whether pasting a fake visa onto a
genuine passport constituted forgery of an identification document”).
291. Id.
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proceeds . . . .”292 The other group was told the defendant was a
father who had tried to sneak into the U.S. to earn money so he
could pay for a liver transplant to save the life of his critically ill,
nine-year-old daughter.293 There was, therefore, a huge difference
in the sympathy one would likely feel for the defendant—but not a
difference relevant to whether pasting a forged visa into a
legitimate passport constituted forging an identification card.294
Did it affect the judges’ decisions? Yes, and pretty
dramatically.295 “Among the judges who reviewed the father
version, [only] 44% (102 out of 234) ruled that the act constituted
forgery, as compared to 60% (154 out of 257) out of the judges who
reviewed the killer version.”296
C. When Does Professional Expertise Intervene?
Although they have not tested all possible heuristics, it seems
clear from the RGW studies that judges as a group unwittingly
employ intuitive thinking on a regular basis.297 But their research
also shows that occasionally, professional training and habits of
mind allow judges to override the misleading influence of System
1.298 This could happen in a couple of ways.
First, under some circumstances experts can develop such
extensive, specific knowledge and skills that a mental operation
that would normally be a System 2 (deliberative) task becomes
automatic and intuitive.299 Chess grandmasters, for example,
292. Id.
293. Id. at 877–78.
294. See id. at 878 (detailing the effects of including facts about a hypothetical
defendants’ sick child).
295. For an overview of the study results, see id.
296. Id. For another study showing a powerful unacknowledged influence of
defendants’ characteristics on judicial reasoning, see Holger Spamann & Lars
Klohn, Justice is Less Blind, and Less Legalistic than We Thought: Evidence from
an Experiment with Real Judges, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 255, 255 (2016) (finding that
defendant characteristics have a strong effect).
297. See Heart Versus Head, supra note 229, at 861 (“The belief that judges
cannot be as dispassionate as their roles demand is widespread.”).
298. See Blinking, supra note 37, at 30 (“[R]ecent research suggests that some
experts use intuitive thinking successfully.”).
299. See ROBIN HOGARTH, EDUCATING INTUITION 204 (2001) (“Many processes
or reactions to stimuli that once relied heavily on the deliberate system can over
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develop such a deep sense of the game that they intuitively
recognize patterns.300 However, it is unlikely that judges often
acquire a level of internalized reflection that would protect them
from the operation of heuristics.301 The conditions under which
judges work (complex, varying decisions and limited feedback) are
a serious impediment to developing the kind of deep but automatic
pattern recognition that helps chess masters.302
Second, judges’ training and practice in legal reasoning seems
to allow System 2 deliberative thinking to overcome the influence
of heuristics when the decision in question is about law application
and is governed by a web of quite specific rules (as compared to
discretionary decisions, general standards, or balancing tests).303
In one RGW test, designed to see if judges tend to err based on the
hindsight heuristic, all of the judges were given the same core set
of facts:
A police officer was on patrol outside a rock concert. The officer
saw a well-dressed, nervous-looking man exit a BMW and fiddle
with something in the trunk before he entered the concert. A
half hour later, the officer noticed that one of the BMW’s
windows was down. Concerned that someone might burglarize
the car, he approached to close the window. Upon reaching the
car, he smelled something that he believed, based on a
demonstration at a training session several years earlier, to be
burnt methamphetamine. He looked inside the car and didn’t

time become automatic and thus bypass consciousness. This migration from the
deliberate system to the tacit [system] is an important characteristic of the
phenomenon of expertise.”).
300. See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited:
Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 51 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel
Kahneman eds., 2002) (“A demonstration of the intelligence of System [1] is the
ability of chess masters to perceive the strength or weakness of chess positions
instantly.”).
301. See Blinking, supra note 37, at 32 (noting that the appeals process most
judges face does not allow the development of an analytical process).
302. See id. (“[J]udges operate in an environment that does not allow them to
perfect their intuitive decision-making processes.”).
303. See id. at 28 (“[T]his work suggests that judges are inclined, at least
when presented with certain stimuli, to make intuitive decisions, but that they
have the capacity to override intuition with deliberative thinking.”).
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see any drugs, but he did notice some Visine, a local map, and a
couple of empty beer cans.304

Participating judges were divided into two groups. The
“foresight” judges were asked to say, based on these facts, whether
this information supplied sufficient probable cause that they would
issue a telephonic search warrant when called by the officer.305 The
“hindsight” judges, however, were told that the police officer
“conducted a warrantless search of the trunk and found ten pounds
of methamphetamine, other drug paraphernalia, and a recently
fired gun that had been used earlier in the day to murder a drug
dealer across town.”306 Judges in that group were asked to rule on
a motion to suppress the evidence found in that warrantless
search, because the officer lacked probable cause.307
If the hindsight bias was at work, one would expect judges who
were aware of the contents of the trunk to rule in favor of the police
at a higher rate, even though in both cases the legal issue was
probable cause to search the car.308 But that’s not what happened:
the responses of the foresight and hindsight groups were extremely
similar.309 What explains this unusual result? One possibility is
that the judges used System 2 deliberation, applying the legal
analysis demanded by the Fourth Amendment, to rule without
regard to what was found in the warrantless search.310 This could
be true because there is a large array of rules to apply and because
“the intricacy of this area of law signals to the judge that intuition
might be inconsistent with law and therefore they will need to
304. Id. at 26–27.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. See id. at 28 (underscoring the basic premises of the study).
309. Id. at 27.
310. See id. at 28 (characterizing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as
“highly intricate” and “rule-bound”). In contrast, a different test of hindsight bias
showed that judges were influenced by knowledge of the outcome of an appeal
when asked to identify the most likely ex ante ruling on a Rule 11 motion for
sanctions—a decision granting the judge far wider discretion, governed by more
general standards. See Blinking, supra note 37, at 25–26. Numerous other studies
have shown judges to be influenced by hindsight bias in other contexts. See, e.g.,
Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information, supra note 253, at 1316 (“The vast
literature on the hindsight bias includes virtually no studies that fail to uncover
evidence of the hindsight bias in ex post assessments of ex ante probabilities.”).
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think through the rules created by the appellate courts
carefully.”311 This explanation is consistent with a study (using
undergraduates and law students as subjects) finding that legal
training reduced bias from stereotyping when the subjects had
been taught legal rules that applied to the cases they were given,
but did not reduce bias when the training covered more general
standards.312
It is important to note, though, that this experiment was based
on stipulated facts and is about application of well-established law
to those facts. It does not speak to the inference drawing/fact
finding process and whether it would be influenced by hindsight
bias.313 But the reality of most pretrial disputes may well be that
the facts are not agreed. For example, in a motion to suppress in a
criminal case such as this one, if the question is whether to believe
an officer’s testimony that a defendant made a furtive motion or
consented to a search, judges’ decisions about whom to believe
could well be influenced by what they know about the fruits of the
search.314
Another possibility is that, given the frequency of probable
cause hearings, judges develop rule-of-thumb heuristics applicable
to common fact patterns in order to guide their rulings.315 They
might, for example, refuse to find probable cause based only on
vague assertions that the police smelled drugs or refuse to find
probable cause for most car-trunk searches.316 In either case, this
study provides evidence that some circumstances—particularly
311. Blinking, supra note 37, at 27.
312. See Erik J. Girvan, Wise Restraints?: Learning Legal Rules, Not
Standards, Reduces the Effects of Stereotypes in Legal Decision-Making, 22
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 31, 41 (2016) (finding stereotypic warmth when
participants had no training and decided cases based on legal standards but no
stereotypic warmth when participants did have legal training and decided cases
in which legal rules applied).
313. See id. (explaining that the facts were given to participants rather than
derived through a separate fact-finding process).
314. I am indebted to Jeremy Fogel, former U.S. District Judge, former
Director of the Federal Judicial Center, and current Executive Director of the
Berkeley Judicial Institute, for this point and example.
315. See Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information, supra note 253, at
1318 (noting the usefulness of these rule-of-thumb heuristics).
316. See id. (providing examples of rule-of-thumb heuristics).
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well-developed facts and intricate legal rules—can cue judges to
use their professional analytical skills to trump the automatic
heuristic response.317
D. Implicit Bias
This subpart looks at heuristics’ more insidious potential
effects; they are the gateway to the operation of implicit biases
based on factors such as race, gender, national origin, age, and
religion. “Implicit biases are discriminatory biases based on
implicit attitudes or implicit stereotypes.”318 We say that these
attitudes and stereotypes are implicit when the person holding
them is not intentional or even conscious of the bias.319 They can
be especially difficult for the law to deal with, because implicit
biases may be different from a person’s conscious beliefs but
nevertheless affect the person’s actions.320
One very common way to try to measure degrees of implicit
associations between stereotypes and individual images is the
“Implicit Association Test” (IAT), which is administered by
Harvard University,321 and has been taken by millions of people
over the years.322 The IAT is a sorting test in which the subject is
317. See Girvan, supra note 312, at 41 (noting that judges are not always at
the mercy of their heuristic responses).
318. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias:
Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 951 (2006). In social psychology, an
“attitude” is “an evaluative disposition—that is, the tendency to like or dislike, or
to act favorably or unfavorably toward, someone or something.” Id. at 948. A
“stereotype” is “a mental association between a social group or category and a
trait.” Id. at 949. For example, a stereotype might be an association between old
people and driving skill, and the attitude (unfavorable) would be that older people
are poor drivers.
319. See id. at 946 (“[T]he science of implicit cognition suggests that actors do
not always have conscious, internal control over the processes of social perception,
impression formation, and judgment that motivate their actions.”).
320. See id. at 951 (describing the effect of implicit bias).
321. See
Project
Implicit,
HARV.
UNIV.
(2011),
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/ (last visited Dec. 11, 2019) (providing an
online forum for users to discover their implicit associations) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
322. For a fuller discussion of the IAT, see Anthony G. Greenwald et al.,
Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association
Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1464 (1998).
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asked to match categories and traits that are often associated with
implicit
biases—such
as
Male/Female
sorted
with
Career/Family.323 It tends to take longer to tap the computer key
that matches the categories with traits that are contrary to
stereotypes.324 For example, it may take longer to match words or
images associated with Female to those associated with Career
than to those related to Family. Those time differences generate a
score that reflects how strong an association the IAT-taker has
between the category and the trait.325 A person taking the test
described, for example, might learn that the test has shown them
to have a mild association between Female and Family. The best
known IAT focuses on race,326 but there are also tests looking at
associations based on age, religion, political party, sexual
orientation, mental illness, weight, and more.327
The collective results of years of IAT tests are worrying:
In the case of race, scientists have found that most European
Americans who have taken the test are faster at pairing a white
face with a good word (e.g., honest) and a black face with a bad
word (e.g., violent) than the other way around. For
African-Americans, approximately a third show a preference for
African-Americans, a third show a preference for European
Americans, and a third show no preference.328

Showing an unconscious association is not the same as
showing that people act on that association, and research on the
latter is ongoing.329 There is, however, evidence that implicit
associations can affect decisions, including hiring,330 medical
323. Id.
324. Id. at 1466.
325. See id. at 1465 (illustrating the association effects of the IAT using
several examples).
326. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 318, at 952 (providing a detailed
description of the tasks involved in this version of the IAT).
327. Id. at 949.
328. Pamela M. Casey et al., Addressing Implicit Bias in the Courts, 49 CT.
REV.: J. AM. JUDGES ASS’N 64, 64–65 (2013).
329. See, e.g., Oswald et al., Predicting Ethnic and Racial Discrimination: A
Meta-Analysis of IAT Criterion Studies, 105 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 171,
172–73 (2013).
330. See, e.g. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and
Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor
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treatment,331 and perceptions of a suspect’s dangerousness.332
There are also studies that do not show a relationship between IAT
scores and behavior.333
There have been few experimental studies trying to assess
judges’ implicit bias. The RGW trio did one test of black/white bias
among generalist judges in criminal cases, using state court judges
(133 state or local trial judges) as subjects.334 Their IAT results
showed that judges, like most white Americans, more closely
associate African Americans than whites with negative
concepts.335 The results of their experiments showed that those
biases sometimes influenced judgments in hypothetical cases.336 It
also showed, though, that in some instances—when the judges
were aware of a need to monitor their own responses for the
influence of implicit racial bias and motivated to suppress
it— judges could focus more consciously on the issue of race and
compensate for their implicit bias.337
Two of their tests did not involve explicit mentions of race, but
were preceded by a subconscious “priming” task in which the test
subjects were (or were not) exposed to words associated with black
Americans.338 They found in both cases that “judges who expressed
a white preference on the IAT were somewhat more likely to
impose harsher penalties when primed with black-associated
Market Discrimination, 94 AMER. ECON. REV. 991, 1011 (2004); Dan-Olof Rooth,
Automatic Associations and Discrimination in Hiring: Real World Evidence, 17
LABOUR ECON. 523, 530 (2010).
331. See Anthony Green et al., Implicit Bias Among Physicians and Its
Prediction of Thrombolysis Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 1231, 1231 (2007) (detailing implicit bias within the medical
profession).
332. See Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and
Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006,
1006 (2007) (finding that police officers and general members of the community
exhibit “robust racial bias” in decisions whether to shoot).
333. See Oswald et al., supra note 329, at 188 (“[T]he IAT provides little
insight into who will discriminate against whom, and provides no more insight
than explicit measures of bias.”).
334. Unconscious Racial Bias, supra note 253, at 1205.
335. Id. at 1197.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 1197, 1221.
338. See id. at 1212–13 (examples include Harlem, homeboy, rap, basketball,
gospel, Oprah, dreadlocks, welfare, rhythm, and soul).
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words than when primed with neutral words, while judges who
expressed a black preference on the IAT reacted in an opposite
fashion to the priming conditions.”339
On the other hand, when race was more explicit, there was no
significant correlation between conviction and the judges’ IAT
scores.340 “Judges who exhibited strong white preferences on the
IAT did not judge the white and black defendants differently, and
neither did judges who expressed black preferences on the IAT.”341
The researchers attributed this result to the judges’ awareness
(even though not told, most figured it out) that they were being
studied for racial bias, and they were highly motivated to avoid
being seen as biased in carrying out their assigned task.342
Absent the triggering and motivation, there are grounds to
worry that judges are not sufficiently self-aware to correct for bias.
The same researchers asked a group of judges to rate their ability
to “avoid racial prejudice in decision making”343 relative to other
judges attending the same conference. Thirty-five out of thirty-six
(97%) of the judges rated themselves in the top half, and eighteen
out of the thirty-six (50%) rated themselves in the top quarter of
ability.344 The RGW group noted, “We worry that this result means
that judges are overconfident in their ability to avoid the influence
339. Id. at 1217.
340. See id. at 1219 (“[W]e did not even find a marginally significant
interaction here.”).
341. Id. These results were quite different from results using the same
materials as this third test by Professors Sommers & Ellsworth, who had only
white subjects and who found that ninety percent of the participants who read
about an African American defendant said that they would convict as compared
to only seventy percent of participants who read about a Caucasian participant.
Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation
of Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL.,
PUB. POL’Y, & L. 201, 216–17 (2001).
342. See Unconscious Racial Bias, supra note 253, at 1223–24 (suggesting
that white judges “probably engaged in cognitive correction to avoid the
appearance of bias”).
343. Id. at 1225.
344. Id. This result is consistent with a study of administrative law judges:
97.2% placed themselves in the top half compared to other attendees with respect
to their capacity for avoiding bias in judging (50% in the top quartile and 47.2%
in the second quartile). Chris Guthrie et al., The “Hidden” Judiciary: An
Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1519
(2009).
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of race and hence fail to engage in corrective processes on all
occasions.”345
As part of a larger experiment designed to see whether
specialist judges would be more able to overcome heuristics, the
RGW group tested whether the race of a debtor would affect the
decision of a bankruptcy judge.346 They gave the judges an
elaborate fact pattern involving discharge of student debt for
undue hardship; the test for discharge required the judge to make
findings about three specific factors.347 Everything was identical,
except that the name of the debtor varied, using names that prior
researchers had indicated were associated with African Americans
or with Anglos.348 The results showed no statistically significant
racial bias.349 Judges given debtors with African American
sounding names discharged a mean of 56.2% of the debt ($47,106),
while those given debtors with Anglo-sounding names discharged
a mean of 57.9% ($48,506) of the debt.350 Although not correlated
with race, it is interesting to note that Democratic judges
discharged a mean of $50,972, while Republican judges discharged
a mean of $34,232.351 This would seem to indicate that there was
enough leeway involved in the decision to generate
differences— but for this group of bankruptcy judges, political
attitudes about debtors and government assistance were far more
significant than race in influencing the judges’ decisions.352
345. Unconscious Racial Bias, supra note 253, at 1226.
346. See Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, supra note 251, at 1245–47 (outlining the
facts and materials involved in the problem).
347. Id. at 1247.
348. Id. The names identified as African American-sounding were Ebony,
Latonya, Kenya, Latoya, Tanisha, Lakisha, Tamika, Keisha, and Aisha. The
names identified as Anglo-sounding were Kristen, Carrie, Laurie, Meredith,
Sarah, Allison, Jill, Anne, and Emily. Id. These names were previously used on
fake resumes in an employment-bias test conducted by Marianne Bertrand and
Sendhil Mullainathan. Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 330, at 1011.
349. Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, supra note 251, at 1247.
350. Id. Some of the judges reported after the presentation of the test results
that they did not remember the name of the debtors in their cases, perhaps
because their attention was elsewhere. Id. at 1248. The factual and legal
complexity of the task likely triggered the use of System 2 cognition.
351. Id. at 1247–48.
352. Id. at 1248. A different group of experimenters examined implicit bias
targeting different groups, testing for implicit bias regarding Asian Americans
and Jews. Justin D. Levinson et al., Judging Implicit Bias: A National Empirical
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In observational studies examining the potential impact of
judges’ personal characteristics, including race and gender,
patterns emerge in cases in which that characteristic might be
salient, indicating that the judges’ “experience” differs in ways that
can affect outcomes. It would make sense that a judge’s lived
experience as a member of a traditionally disadvantaged group
might affect the inferences that the judge would draw. Many of the
studies are in the context of the criminal justice system.353 On the
civil side, one context is especially enlightening: cases alleging
employment discrimination based on race or gender. For example,
studies found that:
•

Female judges favored plaintiffs in employment
discrimination cases relative to their male counterparts. 354

•

For female trial judges, the average predicted probability of
ruling for the sex discrimination plaintiff was thirty-five
percent.355 For male judges, this number was only twenty
percent.356

•

There was a 126% increase in the likelihood of a black trial
judge ruling in favor of the EEOC’s race discrimination claim
compared to a white trial judge.357

•

Plaintiffs in racial harassment cases were successful in
forty-six percent of their cases before black judges but less
than half as often before white judges; logistic regression
analysis indicated that on average, plaintiffs before black

Study of Judicial Stereotypes, 69 FLA. L. REV. 63, 68–69 (2017). They administered
the test to 180 federal judges and fifty-nine state judges. Id. at 68. On their IAT
tests, the judges showed moderate to strong implicit bias against both Asians
(relative to Caucasians) and Jews (relative to Christians). Id.
353. See, e.g., Unconscious Racial Bias, supra note 253, at 1218 (finding that
in a hypothetical battery case “black judges were significantly more willing to
convict the defendant when he was identified as Caucasian rather than as African
American”).
354. Donald R. Songer et al., A Reappraisal of Diversification in the Federal
Courts: Gender Effects in the Courts of Appeals, 56 J. POL. 425, 436 (1994).
355. Christina L. Boyd, Representation on the Courts? The Effects of Trial
Judges’ Sex and Race, 69 POL. RES. Q. 788, 793 (2016).
356. Id.
357. Id. at 793–94. Black judges were also more likely than white judges to
rule in favor of plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases. Id. at 794.
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judges were 3.3 times more likely to win than before white
judges.358

One recent study is intriguing, supporting the possibility that
the judge’s experience, rather than sheer identity alone, can affect
inferences.359 Using a data set on judges’ families and a data set of
nearly 1,000 gender related cases, Professors Glynn and Sen found
that judges with at least one daughter vote in a more liberal
fashion on gender issues than judges with no daughter.360 “The
effect is robust and appears driven largely by male Republican
appointees.”361 The most likely explanation: “having daughters
leads judges to learn about issues that they ordinarily would not
be exposed to—such as discrimination on the basis of pregnancy,
Title IX, and reproductive rights issues.”362 In other words, having
daughters can change the judges’ experience and view of the world
in ways that makes inferences in favor of female litigants more
plausible.363
Federal judges in particular live in a somewhat rarified, elite
environment in which they are isolated from both lawyers and the
public, and they are treated with great deference. All of that can
be a good thing when it comes to avoiding ethical conflicts and
respecting the role of the courts, but it makes it even more
challenging for them to have experiences that give them insights
into the personal and professional experiences of everyday
litigants. The judges’ own experiences will predictably affect the

358. Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An
Empirical Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1156
(2009). See also Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender and
Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759,
1761 (2005) (reporting on gender-based panel effects in Title VII appeals).
359. Adam N. Glynn & Maya Sen, Identifying Judicial Empathy: Does Having
Daughters Cause Judges to Rule for Women’s Issues?, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 37, 37
(2015).
360. Id. at 38.
361. Id. Having daughters had no effect on cases without a gender dimension.
Id. at 47.
362. Id. at 51. Cf. Patricia Yancey Martin et al., Gender Bias and Feminist
Consciousness Among Judges and Attorneys: A Standpoint Theory Analysis, 27
SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 665, 667 (2002) (“[I]ndividuals’ social location
in the sex-gender system affects their experiences, interpretations, and,
ultimately, consciousness within and beyond legal contexts.”).
363. Glynn & Sen, supra note 359, at 51.
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generalizations they bring to inference-drawing, and their
heuristics can amplify the biases that result.
E. Cultural Cognition
Another type of non-merits influence that can affect the ways
that judges draw inferences is cultural cognition. “Cultural
cognition refers to the tendency of individuals to conform their
beliefs about disputed matters of fact . . . to values that define their
cultural identities.”364 Cultural cognition does not grow solely out
of an over-use of heuristics.365 “On the contrary, multiple studies
have found that the individuals most proficient in and most
disposed to resort to System 2 modes of information processing are
even more likely to construe information in a manner that evinces
identity-protective reasoning.”366 Nevertheless, a cluster of System
1 heuristics form the backbone of cultural cognition.367
The mechanisms that result in cultural cognition include the
availability heuristic, biased assimilation of information,368
credibility (social affinities used to assess credibility and
trustworthiness of sources of information),369 and affect heuristic
(identity-protective motivations “to conform one’s beliefs to those
of like-minded others in order to avoid dissonance and protect
364. The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, YALE L. SCH.,
https://perma.cc/V2Q8-K3TR (last visited Sept. 5, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
365. See Dan M. Kahan et al., “Ideology” or “Situation Sense”? An
Experimental Investigation of Motivated Reasoning and Professional Judgment,
164 U. PA. L. REV. 349, 369 (2016) [hereinafter “Ideology” or “Situation Sense”?]
(“Experimental study of identity-protective cognition, however, shows that it is
not a consequence of over-reliance on heuristic information processing.”).
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Who Fears the HPV Vaccine, Who Doesn’t, and
Why? An Experimental Study in the Mechanisms of Cultural Cognition, 34 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 501, 510 (2010) [hereinafter Who Fears the HPV Vaccine] (“Biased
assimilation refers to the tendency of individuals selectively to credit and dismiss
information in a manner that confirms their prior beliefs.”).
369. See id. at 504 (“[C]ultural affinity and cultural difference supply the
relevant in-group/out-group references that in turn determine whom people see
as knowledgeable, honest, and unbiased, and thus worthy of being credited in
debates about risk.”).
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social standing”).370 In fact, much of the difference in perception
“coheres with membership in groups integral to personal identity,
such as race, gender, political party membership, and religious
affiliation . . . .”371 The net result of these factors can be that
perception of facts is unconsciously motivated by a person’s
identity-defining commitments.372 The theory of cultural cognition
also complements the heuristic model by “showing how one and the
same heuristic process (whether availability, credibility, loss
aversion, or affect) can generate different perceptions of risk in
people with opposing outlooks.”373
Researchers at Yale Law School’s Cultural Cognition Project
have done two particularly noteworthy experiments to assess the
impact of cultural cognition on legally relevant fact finding.374 Both
studies examined the test subjects’ interpretations of what they
saw on videotapes.375 One was unedited video that had been the
subject of a U.S. Supreme Court opinion—one in which Justice
Scalia’s majority saw no possibility of differing interpretations.376
370. Dan Kahan et al., Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus, 14 J. RISK
RES. 147, 149 (2011). See also Who Fears the HPV Vaccine, supra note 368, at 506
(identifying biased assimilation and source credibility as the mechanisms behind
cultural cognition).
371. Who Fears the HPV Vaccine, supra note 368, at 503.
372. See They Saw a Protest, supra note 3, at 860 (explaining that even
citizens committed to liberal neutrality will still divide along cultural lines
“[b]ecause their perceptions of risk and related facts are unconsciously motivated
by their defining commitments”). See also Dan M. Kahan, The Politically
Motivated Reasoning Paradigm, Part 1: What Politically Motivated Reasoning Is
and How to Measure It, in EMERGING TRENDS IN SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
1, 3–6 (Robert Scott & Stephen Kosslyn eds., 2016) (comparing and contrasting
politically motivated reasoning with confirmation bias; the goal of the former is
identity protection).
373. Who Fears the HPV Vaccine, supra note 368, at 503.
374. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?: Scott v.
Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 852 (2009)
[hereinafter Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe] (detailing an experiment); They
Saw a Protest, supra note 3, at 851 (same).
375. Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe, supra note 374, at 838; They Saw
a Protest, supra note 3, at 851.
376. Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe, supra note 374, at 903. In the case
that ended up at the Supreme Court as Scott v. Harris, five judges (the trial judge,
the Eleventh Circuit panel, and Justice Stevens) and eight judges (Justice Scalia
and the Supreme Court majority) reached opposite conclusions about whether the
only reasonable inference from the video was that the fleeing driver posed a
significant danger to police or the public. Harris v. Coweta Cty., No. CIVA
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The study, however, demonstrated that people with different
cultural commitments drew very different inferences about danger
and fault from watching the same videotape of a speeding driver
fleeing a police car.377
Another dramatic demonstration of the impact of cultural
cognition involved a video of protesters in a public place.378 The test
subjects379 were shown a video of a political demonstration, but
half believed it to be a protest outside an abortion clinic380 and half
believed that the demonstrators were protesting the military’s
“don’t ask/don’t tell” policy outside of a recruitment facility.381
(Neither was actually true.)382 Whether the subjects thought the
protesters obstructed and threatened pedestrians “[depended]
critically on the relationship between the demonstrators’ causes
and the subjects’ own values. . . . Responses on other items—such
as whether the protestors ‘screamed in the face’ of
pedestrians—displayed similar patterns.”383 In other words, if the
test subjects disagreed with the protesters, they were far more
likely to infer obstruction, screaming, and intent to threaten; if
they agreed with the protesters, they were less likely to infer those

3:01CV148 WBH, 2003 WL 25419527 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2003), rev’d in part, 433
F.3d 807 (11th Cir. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
377. Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe, supra note 374, at 903.
378. They Saw a Protest, supra note 3, at 863.
379. The subjects were 202 American adults who were selected randomly from
a stratified national sample by Polimetrix, Inc. Id. at 869.
380. The abortion clinic version of the video is available here: videoreview12,
Abortion Clinic 11 22 2010, YOUTUBE (Jan. 6, 2011), http://youtu.be/k8ru-FE2v_8
(last visited Sept. 5, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
381. The military recruiting version of the video is available here:
videoreview12, Recruit_Center_11192010.m4v, YOUTUBE (Jan. 6, 2011),
https://youtu.be/X3PJACpL53k (last visited Sept. 5, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
382. They Saw a Protest, supra note 3, at 872–73.
383. Id. at 878, 883. Relatively few study participants from any group
reported seeing spitting or shoving, regardless of their cultural identity. Id. at
883. The researchers believe this to be evidence that differing values only affect
contexts in which there is legitimate room for interpretation. Id. It also helps
show that the participants were not responding in a consciously biased way. Id.

1634

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1567 (2019)

actions.384 And yet all of these groups watched the identical 3.5
minute video.385
There is little empirical testing of the effect of cultural
cognition on judges. One study examined the reactions of a sample
of judges to social science studies relating to the deterrent effect of
the death penalty.386 Although the judges applied evidence law
fairly neutrally in making decisions about admissibility, the
judges’ pre-existing opinions and political outlooks correlated with
their decision about whether to afford “dispositive weight” to the
studies in determining the constitutionality of the death
penalty.387
Political science literature is rife with studies showing a
correlation between judges’ legal decisions and their political
preferences.388 And there is little question that when a normative
position is intrinsic to the judicial decision to be made, judges’
ideology will be reflected in their decisions. But what about
decisions in which the preference-salient fact is not legally
relevant?
One experimental study by Professors Kahan, Hoffman, and
others looked at judges and cultural cognition; it concluded that
non-intrinsic cultural commitments do not influence judges who
are using their System 2 deliberative reasoning to interpret
somewhat ambiguous statutory language in order to apply it to a
set of facts.389 More specifically, the judges and test subjects
considered two hypothetical cases.390 In one, defendants who would
be culturally attractive to one group and unappealing to another
were charged under a statute prohibiting “littering, disposing, or
depositing any form of garbage, refuse, junk, or other debris” on
384. Id. at 878.
385. Id. at 872.
386. See Richard E. Redding & N. Dickon Reppucci, Effects of Lawyers’
Socio-Political Attitudes on Their Judgments of Social Science in Legal Decision
Making, 23 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 31 (1999) (theorizing that judges often ignore social
science research that refutes their sociopolitical beliefs).
387. Id. at 34–35.
388. See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., Ideology and the Study of Judicial Behavior,
in IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LAW 705, 717–23 (Jon Hanson ed., 2012)
(surveying political science literature on ideology and judicial decision making).
389. “Ideology” or “Situation Sense”?, supra note 365, at 410.
390. Id. at 380.
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the “grounds of a national wildlife preserve.”391 Both defendants
were leaving empty water jugs that they intended to use to help
themselves or others.392 In the second hypothetical, the issue was
whether a statute prohibiting “knowing” disclosure of confidential
information would cover actions by a police officer that were done
intentionally but without knowledge that the action was illegal.393
The reasons for disclosure were the variable, this time polarized
around attitudes toward abortion.394
Comparing 253 sitting state court judges to a control group of
800 members of the public (including lawyers and law students),
the study found that judges’ legal training “enables judges of
diverse cultural identities to converge on ‘correct’ answers to
statutory interpretation questions that trigger polarization along
identity-protective lines in the public.”395 The same results were
observed in the lawyers.396 Note, though, that the test cases
involved situations that suggested clear “correct” answers to a
legally-trained person. Items placed in the wildlife reserve to be
useful are unlikely to be “garbage, refuse, junk, or debris.”397 Even
more so, the oft-invoked principle that “ignorance of the law is no
excuse” may have made it seem quite obvious to lawyers that an
intentional act was “knowing.”398 This result—the ability of a clear
legal principle to override heuristic biases—is consistent with
Professor Girvan’s study (on law students) showing that legal rules
can override heuristic biases, while standards and balancing tests
do not.399 It would be interesting to see a study in which the
interpretation-application task was in a context which would seem
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 382.
394. Id.
395. See James R. Steiner-Dillon, Epistemic Exceptionalism, 52 IND. L. REV.
207, 232 (2019) (describing the study by Kahan).
396. “Ideology” or “Situation Sense”?, supra note 365, at 411.
397. Id. at 380–82.
398. Id. at 382–84.
399. See supra note 312 and accompanying text (describing the results of
Girvan’s study). On the other hand, this study contrasts interestingly with the
RGW study of the impact of affect. See Heart Versus Head, supra note 229, at
877–88 (finding that judges’ interpretation of an ambiguous statute varied with
the sympathy one would feel with the defendant).
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more indeterminate even to legally trained test subjects. Would
the judges’ cultural identities exert more influence under those
conditions?
This study also does not purport to address the question of
whether judges’ cultural cognition affects their decisions about
disputed facts, including inferences.400 The RGW group, in writing
about a study of judges’ susceptibility to the affect heuristic,
predicted that the impact on fact finding might be even stronger
than that on legal analysis: “We cannot say for sure, of course, but
we believe that emotion exerts even greater influence on fact
finding. Many believe that facts are more uncertain than law, and
the greater the indeterminacy the greater the opportunity for
extrinsic influences, such as affect, to intrude.”401
F. Judicial Demographics
Heuristics are mental processes that operate to foreground
information, but they will bring forward different information for
different people, because those people have different information
and experiences (availability), and different attitudes
(confirmation and affect heuristics, implicit biases, and cultural
identities). These differences will lead to different generalizations
and different inferences. Across the federal judiciary, the collective
impact of heuristics would be somewhat less worrying if the
judiciary were well-balanced in terms of professional and life
experiences and cultural commitments. But is this the case?
The Congressional Research Service did a study of the
demographics of the federal district and circuit courts as of June
2017.402 Focusing on the district courts, where the bulk of the
400. See “Ideology” or “Situation Sense”?, supra note 365, at 410 (noting the
study’s scope).
401. Heart Versus Head, supra note 229, at 904.
402. BARRY J. MCMILLION, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43426, U.S. CIRCUIT AND
DISTRICT COURT JUDGES: PROFILE OF SELECT CHARACTERISTICS (2017). While the
study also contained information about sitting judges’ job positions immediately
prior to being appointed to their current federal judicial position, its categories
are too broad to be very informative (e.g. “private practice”), and it does not
contain information about all of the judge’s pre-bench professional work. The
percentage of judges coming to the district bench directly from private practice
has decreased over time. See Russell Wheeler, Changing Backgrounds of U.S.
District Judges: Likely Causes and Possible Implications, 93 JUDICATURE 140, 141
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pretrial inferences are made, the data shows a group that is
heavily white, male, and older. Of the 570 active district judges at
that time, only 194 (34%) were women.403 In terms of race, 406
(71%) were white, 81 (14%) were African American, 58 (10%) were
Hispanic, 16 (3%) were Asian American, 1 (.2%) was American
Indian, and 8 (1.4%) were multiracial.404 Of the ten judicial
districts with the highest percentage of the population that is
African American, four had no currently serving African American
judges (the Southern and Middle Districts of Alabama, Southern
District of Georgia, and Western District of Louisiana).405
It is likely that the percentage of white and male judges has
increased somewhat under President Trump. As of August 5, 2019,
of his ninety-nine appointees to the federal district courts, he
appointed sixty-four (64.6%) white male and nineteen (19.2%)
white female district court judges (so 83.8% of his appointees are
white).406 He appointed fourteen (14.1%) district court judges of
either sex (three female, eleven male) who are non-white.407
Some research indicates that the presence of some
nontraditional judges may help to broaden the perspective of other
(2010) (showing that sixty-seven percent of President Eisenhower’s appointees to
the U.S. district bench came from private practice, while only thirty-four percent
of President George W. Bush’s appointees did so).
403. MCMILLION, supra note 402, at 15.
404. Id. at 17.
405. Id. When gender and race are combined, the data show that as of June
2017, 49.3% of federal district judges were white men, 21.9% were white women,
8.1% were African American men, 6.1% were African American women, 6.5% were
Hispanic men, 3.7% were Hispanic women, 1.6% were Asian American men, and
1.2% were Asian American women. Id. at 19–20. The report noted that all
categories other than white men are considered to be “nontraditional” and that
56.1% of the active nontraditional district judges had been appointed by President
Obama. Id. at 21–22. Statistics on age show that the federal district judges skew
older. In June of 2017, the average age of a U.S. District Judge was 60.8 years
(the median was 61.3). Id. at 23. The largest group (269 judges—or 47.2%) are
between the ages of 60 and 69. Id. An additional fifty-three judges (9.3%) are
seventy or older, making 56.5% of all federal district judges over sixty years of
age. Id.
406. Calculations were made using the search tool Biographical Directory of
Article III Federal Judges, 1789–Present, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
https://perma.cc/3GBP-E2SL (last visited Sept. 5, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
407. Id.
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judges. One type of study focuses on the courts of appeal and looks
at “panel effects,” while others examine the possibility that a
critical mass of nontraditional judges can make a difference.408 In
that regard, the federal district courts are a mixed bag. In June of
2017, there was at least one active female district judge in eighty
of ninety-one district courts, but there were no women serving on
eleven district courts.409 Thirty-seven district courts had only one
active female judge.410 Lack of racial minorities was even more
dramatic. In June of 2017, “there were African American judges
serving on 44, or 48%, of the nation’s 91 U.S. district courts;
Hispanic judges serving on 24 (26%) of the courts; and Asian
American judges serving on 12 (13%) of the courts.”411
Twenty-three of the district courts that did have an African
American judge had only one.412 Only seven courts have at least
one active district judge from all three of the groups counted (“i.e.,

408. See, e.g., Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin,
Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389, 406
(2010) (“For males at relatively average levels of ideology, the likelihood of a
liberal, pro-plaintiff vote increases by almost 85% when sitting with a female
judge.”); Pat K. Chew, Comparing the Effects of Judges’ Gender and Arbitrators’
Gender in Sex Discrimination Cases and Why it Matters, 32 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 195, 202 (2017) (“[E]vidence indicates that when groups are comprised of
more diverse members, those members learn from each other and provide checks
on the correctness of shared information, ultimately leading to more accurate
decisionmaking.”); Paul M. Collins, Jr., Kenneth L. Manning & Robert A. Carp,
Gender, Critical Mass, and Judicial Decision Making, 32 L. & POL’Y 260, 265
(2010) (“Prior research suggests that the mere presence of decision makers from
an underrepresented group in the overall decision-making environment may be
enough to have a discernable effect on the output of that environment, so long as
a certain ‘critical mass’ is reached.”); Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro,
Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority Representation
Under Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 299, 300 (2004) (arguing that
an institutional norm of unanimity encourages deliberation, which in turn may
allow numerical minorities on panels to influence case outcomes). But cf.
Unconscious Racial Bias, supra note 253, at 1227 (describing a study in which
white judges, in a jurisdiction consisting of roughly half white and half black
judges, still showed strong implicit biases, and observing that “[e]xposure to a
group of esteemed black colleagues apparently is not enough to counteract the
societal influences that lead to implicit biases”).
409. MCMILLION, supra note 402, at 15.
410. Id. at 16.
411. Id. at 17.
412. Id.
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there was at least one active African American, Hispanic, and
Asian American judge serving on the court”).413
From an income perspective, federal district judges are, by
virtue of their salaries alone, in a place that makes them different
from many litigants. For 2017, the annual salary of federal district
judges was $205,100.414 The U.S. Census Bureau puts the 2017
median household income at $61,372, so judges are well above the
median.415 In fact, a recent Economic Policy Institute study shows
that the district judge salary is comfortably in the average salary
of the top ten percent of earners for 2017.416
Taking all of this demographic information together, it seems
possible that the experience of the federal district judges as a group
may be skewed toward the experiences of the affluent, white, male
majority.417 While studies do not seem to show across-the-board
differences between the decisions of male and female judges, or
between white judges and judges of color, there is evidence of race
and gender differences when race or gender is a salient issue in the
case.418 Further studies, examining more fine-tuned heuristics,
implicit biases, and cultural commitments may find additional
effects. In any case, conscious efforts to appoint a body of trial-level
judges who are diverse across a number of measures would help to
avoid overall tipping of inferences and even substantive law in
favor of the experiences of a homogeneous group.419
413. Id.
414. Judicial Salaries: U.S. District Court Judges, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
https://perma.cc/URM3-X5TN (last visited Sept. 5, 2018) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
415. Jonathan L. Rothbaum, U.S. Census Bureau, Redesigned Questions May
Contribute to Increase, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 12, 2018),
https://perma.cc/TE9H-46NW (last visited Sept. 5, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
416. Lawrence Mishel & Julia Wolfe, Top 1% Reaches Highest Wages
Ever—Up 157% Since 1979, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Oct. 18, 2018, 11:49 AM),
https://perma.cc/28ZC-UZMJ (last visited Sept. 5, 2019) (see Table 1) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
417. See supra notes 402–416 and accompanying text (noting that most judges
in the U.S. are white males).
418. See supra notes 354–358 and accompanying text (describing the effect of
various biases on case outcomes).
419. For example, it can be argued that the heuristics and biases of the
dominant culture have caused the substantive law of employment discrimination
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G. Summary

Where does all this get us? With respect to judges as a group:
•

During the pretrial period, they make countless
decisions that are based on the evaluation and drawing
of inferences.420

•

Those inferences can differ significantly from judge to
judge.421

•

Those differences often turn on differences in the judges’
“experience and common sense” and the generalizations
that those factors produce.422

•

That “experience and common sense” expresses itself
through
the
powerful
operation
of
mental
shortcuts—heuristics
and
biases—that
work
automatically and at an unconscious level in a way that
can influence even deliberate decision making.423

•

At times, the heuristics pave the way for implicit biases
and culturally motivated cognition to affect judicial
decisions, even in judges who are consciously committed
to an unbiased and impartial judicial system.424

•

The heuristics and biases can be particularly hard to
tame, because of a cluster of person-centered heuristics
that falsely lead people (including judges) to believe
that they are more correct, their opinions more
universally held, and their ability to avoid biases more
exceptional than is in fact the case.425

•

Judges’ legal and professional training does not
overcome the powerful influence of the unconscious
processes in most cases that have been studied.426

to be shaped in a way that turns certain inferences (or rejection of inferences) into
legal presumptions. See Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109,
118–21 (2012) (noting presumptions regarding “stray remarks,” “honest beliefs,”
and the requirements for comparators).
420. See supra Part III.
421. See supra Part III.
422. See supra Part IV.
423. See supra Part V.A.
424. See supra Part V.D–E.
425. See supra notes 211–214 and accompanying text.
426. See supra Part V.B.
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•

In situations involving legal analysis (as opposed to
fact-finding), judges have sometimes shown themselves
able to overcome the influence of hindsight bias and
cultural cognition to apply a clear, applicable rule, but
there are, as of yet, no studies with comparable results
for fact-finding.427

•

In situations where the danger of racial bias is explicit,
motivated judges may be able to consciously offset the
bias when applying legal standards to a fact pattern. 428
However, when racial issues are suggested
unconsciously, implicit associations influence the
judge.429

•

The demographics of the federal judiciary support a
concern that the collective implementation of
“experience and common sense” will skew both
individual cases and the development of the law
generally in the direction of the predominant judicial
background, to the detriment of a wider array of
experiences.430

More studies will be needed for a richer understanding of
judicial cognition. But there is enough information already to give
reasons for concern, especially given the pervasive nature of
judicial fact inferences. Part VI will consider what systemic
changes might help the inference process operate in a more reliable
way.
VI. Improving the System
Inferences are certainly not going away. But there are
measures that the federal courts could take to lessen the impact of
problematic heuristics on the pretrial process. First, sustained
training on heuristics, biases, and ways to combat them might
have some effect. Second, practices that activate deliberative
427. See supra Part V.E.
428. See supra Part V.E.
429. But see Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, supra note 251, at 1246–48 (finding
that race did not play a significant role in a study where bankruptcy judges were
asked to discharge an award to a hypothetical debtor with either an African
American- or a white-sounding name).
430. See supra Part V.F.
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thinking and encourage consideration of competing inferences can
be institutionalized. Third, certain rules of procedure (and their
interpretations) should be changed in ways that 1) enrich the
factual record on which the judges rule; and 2) discourage methods
of analysis that allow the judge to compare inferences.
A. Judicial Education
Court systems have already begun to provide judges with
education about the existence of heuristics and techniques to help
deal with them, particularly in the context of implicit bias. The
Federal Judicial Center (FJC) has recently developed a set of
judicial competencies, defined as “an area of proficiency essential
for successful performance in a job.”431 The knowledge
competencies include a broad array of types of social cognition.432
The competencies guide the judicial education curriculum, and the
FJC has over the last several years offered numerous sessions on
heuristics and implicit bias, including in new judge orientation,
programs about “the art of judging” generally, and in
substantive-law-specific programming.433 The FJC website hosts
high-quality information on the nature of implicit bias and ways to
reduce its impact.434 Similarly, the National Center for State
Courts (NCSC) did a three-state pilot project to teach judges and
court staff about implicit bias, and now has helpful resources on its
website.435 Further, the American Judges Association’s project,
431. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, COMPETENCIES FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES v
(June 2018).
432. The list includes cultural practices and norms inside and outside of the
United States; social customs of groups besides one’s own; differences in
communication styles among cultures; impact of implicit bias; impact of
socio-economic status on personal decision making; different norms for
interacting with authority figures; and experiences specific to race, religion,
ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and gender identity. Id. at 8.
433. Telephone Interviews with Judge Jeremy Fogel, then-Director, Federal
Judicial Center; educator Denise Neary, Senior Judicial Education Attorney,
Federal Judicial Center; and researchers Jason Cantone, Senior Research
Associate, and Beth Wiggins, Senior Researcher and Project Director, Federal
Judicial Center (Sept.–Oct. 2018).
434. Jason A. Cantone (curator), Federal and State Court Cooperation:
Reducing Bias, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, https://perma.cc/ZLN3-5XSZ (last
visited Sept. 5, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
435. See Kang et al., supra note 12, at 1175 (describing pilot project); Gender
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Making Better Judges, has resulted in a white paper that
recognizes the influence of heuristics and makes suggestions for
improvement.436
Although it is important that the courts are doing this kind of
education, there is reason to doubt that education alone can have
a decisive impact, particularly if it is delivered in short, episodic
programs. The extensive literature on de-biasing training is
beyond the scope of this Article, but two points are important to
note here.
First, some types of training appear to be more effective than
others in the short run, and they are more effective at raising
awareness than at spurring the adoption of behavioral
countermeasures. For example, one 2014 study tested seventeen
methods for reducing implicit bias and found only eight to be
effective at reducing implicit preferences for whites as compared to
blacks.437 Another meta-study found that the positive effects were
“greater when training was complemented by other diversity
initiatives, targeted to both awareness and skills development, and
conducted over a significant period of time.”438 It is quite clear that
merely telling judges to “try harder” or “be unbiased” will not be
effective.439
and Racial Fairness Resource Guide, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS.,
https://perma.cc/832N-GLPB (last updated Feb. 27, 2019) (last visited Sept. 5,
2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Helping Courts
Address Implicit Bias: Resources for Education, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS. (2012),
https://perma.cc/QVH4-7NRX (last visited Sept. 5, 2019) (providing tools to
combat implicit bias) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
436. Pamela Casey, Kevin Burke & Steve Leben, Minding the Court:
Enhancing the Decision-Making Process, 49 CT. REV.: J. AM. JUDGES ASS’N 76
(2013).
437. Calvin K. Lai et al., Reducing Implicit Racial Preferences I: A
Comparative Investigation of 17 Interventions, 143 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
GEN. 1765, 1766 (2014).
438. Katerina Bezrukova et al., A Meta-Analytical Integration of Over 40
Years of Research on Diversity Training Evaluation, 142 PSYCH. BULL. 1227, 1227
(2016).
439. See Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in
Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 543 (2004) (asserting that research
on attempts to prevent bias and errors in judgment making indicates that direct
approaches, such as simply informing participants of potential bias, are
“generally unsuccessful”).
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Thinking more specifically about judicial education, it may be
that the most effective types of training in using deliberative
rather than intuitive processes might be a combination of
informational programs about heuristics (so that judges recognize
that it is a “thing”) coupled with suggested skills that promote
conscious thought.440 These could include techniques like “consider
the opposite” or “consider alternatives,”441 structured methods of
calling mental attention to perspectives and experiences other
than the judge’s own instinctive ones.442 Education designed to
increase motivation to minimize the impact of unconscious biases
might also enhance the impact of the programs.443 This might
include “periodic public reaffirmation of key professional norms,”
particularly in avoiding bias.444 More generally, “motivated
self-regulation” can result from awareness of bias that is
inconsistent with a judge’s conscious commitments to fairness and
accuracy.445 One study found:
The motivated self-regulation strategy operates by making
people aware of their biased responses that stand in conflict
440. See NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., supra note 435, at 4; Kang et al., supra note
12, at 1174 (suggesting that teaching people about nonconscious thought
processes can lead them to be more skeptical about their own objectivity).
441. See Jackie M. Poos et al., Battling Bias: Effects of Training and Training
Context, 111 COMPUTERS & EDUC. 101, 109 (2017); Heart Versus Head, supra note
229, at 910; Nancy Levit, Confronting Conventional Thinking: The Heuristics
Problem in Feminist Legal Theory, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 391, 436–37 (2006);
Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2463, 2523–24 (2004) (“Psychologists have repeatedly found that considering the
opposite reduces overconfidence, biased information assimilation, biased
hypothesis testing, and excessive perseverance of beliefs. This technique is
effective because it tears people away from anchors favorable to their own
positions and makes contrary anchors more accessible and salient.”).
442. See Simon, supra note 16, at 139 (suggesting techniques that “interfere
in the normal process of making the decision and impede the indiscriminate
adoption of one entire mental model”).
443. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Implicit Bias in Judicial
Decision Making: How it Affects Judgment and What Judges Can Do About It, in
ENHANCING JUSTICE: REDUCING BIAS 87, 116 (Sarah E. Redfield ed., 2017)
[hereinafter Implicit Bias in Judicial Decision Making] (stating that providing
judges with reminders of their professional obligations may keep judges more
conscious in preventing biased decision making).
444. Id.
445. See Mason D. Burns et al., Training Away Bias: The Differential Effects
of Counterstereotype Training and Self-Regulation on Stereotype Activation and
Application, 73 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 97, 108 (2017).
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with their personal beliefs. The resulting feelings of guilt and
disappointment with the self then lead to a cascade of
consequences that help people monitor for and regulate
potentially biased responses in the future. 446

Judicial motivation would likely be essential to successful
education.447 “For any change to take place, it is imperative that
judges be motivated to overcome their automatic processes.”448
Second, there is almost no evidence that anti-bias training has
an effect in the long run. The same researchers who had found
eight out of seventeen of the tested interventions against implicit
bias to be effective did two more studies and reached a depressing
conclusion: “In 2 studies with a total of 6,321 participants, all 9
interventions immediately reduced implicit preferences. However,
none were effective after a delay of several hours to several
days.”449 On a more positive note, one study did show small effects
of training two years later.450
Education about the impact of nonconscious thought
processes, then, might be of some help, especially if done as part of
overall institutional systems and repeated over time.451 It will be
important for judicial education officials to attempt to assess the
effectiveness of the programs they provide, both to identify the
most promising techniques and to try to gauge the judiciary’s level
of achievement of the desired competencies.452 This type of
assessment is difficult because self-reports about unconscious
processes are apt to be unreliable (“No, I am not influenced by
446. Id.
447. Simon, supra note 16, at 140.
448. Id.
449. Calvin K. Lai et al., Reducing Implicit Racial Preferences II: Intervention
Effectiveness Across Time, 145 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 1001, 1002
(2016); see also Bezrukova, supra note 438, at 1242 (“Comparing the immediate
versus long-term effects of diversity training, we found that diversity training
effects on reactions and attitudinal/affective learning decayed over time.”).
450. Patrick Forscher et al., Breaking the Prejudice Habit: Mechanisms,
Timecourse, and Longevity, 72 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 133, 146 (2017)
(finding that participants were more likely to notice bias in themselves and
confront bias in other two years after habit-breaking intervention training).
451. See Kang et al., supra note 12, at 1174 (noting characteristics of effective
education).
452. Lai et al., supra note 449, at 1002.
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unconscious cognition.”).453 Education, though, will not provide the
magic bullet, and so further structural changes will be important.
B. Deliberation-Prompting Practices
The types of educational programs described above are
primarily ways to equip judges to move from the automatic System
1 responses into deliberate System 2 thinking.454 In addition to
training designed to raise awareness of the need to do so and some
techniques for activating diverse perspectives, there are ways to
create institutional requirements that foster more effortful
thought. They would also have the benefit of making decisions
more transparent and demonstrating that even arguments that
the court has not adopted have been heard. Some techniques
operate at the individual-judge level, while others would require
the creation of systemic structures.
Scholars have made a number of suggestions about practices
that can prompt judges to make themselves aware of the impact of
their own unconscious processes.455 A jurisdiction might even
mandate or incentivize use of some of these behaviors, at least in
certain types of cases. Some—such as “consider the
opposite”—have been discussed above as techniques to help make
the judge aware of the contestability of her own intuitions.456 A
related technique is referred to as “perspective-taking.”457 Here the
judge would adopt the viewpoint of other individuals and examine
the scenario through their life experiences.458 The use of decision
protocols such as checklists and scripts may also encourage

453. See Kang et al., supra note 12, at 1176–77 (suggesting that mandatory
disclosure of personal evaluations may “counter the benefits of increased
self-knowledge”).
454. See supra Part V.A (defining System 1 and System 2 cognition).
455. See generally Implicit Bias in Judicial Decision Making, supra note 443;
Kang et al., supra note 12; Heart Versus Head, supra note 229.
456. See supra note 441 and accompanying text (suggesting ways to combat
internal biases in judicial decision-making).
457. Implicit Bias in Judicial Decision Making, supra note 443, at 113.
458. Id. Note, however, that this type of reasoning runs the risk of using
stereotypes in making assumptions about what a person with a particular
identity would be thinking. Id.
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deliberation.459 The checklists could even require the judge to
indicate that he or she had used a deliberative technique such as
“consider the opposite” in order to check for the potential impact of
heuristics.460 These physical reminders of an intention to
counteract the impact of heuristics can help the judge form a new
habit of doing so.461
Retrospective self-analysis could also be helpful. Judges could
record decisional data and periodically review it to look for
patterns.462 As Professor Kang and his co-authors noted, “Judges
need to count.”463 A failure to live up to one’s own expectations can
provide a judge with motivation to continue to try to consider
others’ experiences and to think hard about the universality of
“common sense.” Some judges have recently expressed interest in
seeing a statistical analysis of their own decisions to help monitor
their own performances, indicating that such data might find a
receptive audience. 464
When a decision might be influenced by emotion or affect, the
judge should be encouraged to engage with that emotion rather
than to try to suppress it.465 “Although some judges profess to
459. Id. at 119; NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., supra note 435, at 7. See also Heart
Versus Head, supra note 229, at 910 (asserting that decision protocols facilitate
deliberations by encouraging judges to analyze, share, and explain the feelings
leading to a decision). Although checklists can help, they are also easily
circumvented through unthoughtful, rote compliance if a judge is not actually
motivated to locate and reconsider the impact of heuristics and biases. Research
showing that the application of clear rules can overcome heuristic biases might
argue in favor of replacing flexible legal standards with more fixed rules, but
attempting to do so could be difficult and, worse, substantively undesirable.
460. See Implicit Bias in Judicial Decision Making, supra note 443, at 119
(suggesting that multifactor tests alone are not enough to eliminate implicit bias
because judges may utilize heuristics in a way that would devalue the test).
461. See id. (suggesting that scripts and checklists reduce the likelihood a
judge will overly rely on intuition).
462. See id. at 108–09 (suggesting that judges could perform self-audits by
recording data regarding their discretionary decisions and evaluating this
information over time).
463. Kang et al., supra note 12, at 1178.
464. See Judge Emily Miskel (@emilymiskel), TWITTER (June 4, 2019, 8:22
PM), https://perma.cc/Y8B7-5PB2 (voicing support for statistical data); Chief
Justice Bridget Mary McCormick (@BridgetMaryMc), TWITTER (June 4, 2019, 8:49
PM), https://perma.cc/U9E2-79NN (same).
465. Heart Versus Head, supra note 229, at 910.
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follow suppression strategies, there is no evidence that such
strategies are effective. In general, trying not to think about
something not only is ineffective but may even have an ironic
rebound effect.”466 Similarly, judges should avoid making difficult
decisions when tired, stressed, distracted, or pressured.467
The capstone of a more slow and conscious process would be
the practice of writing opinions that go into some detail about the
reasons for the decision.468 Jurisdictions wanting to
institutionalize this practice could, through statute or procedure
rules, require opinion writing.469 Rethinking the way in which
opinions are written could also promote deeper thought.
Traditionally, once a judge has reached a conclusion, opinions tend
to be written in a way that marshals every argument in support of
that conclusion and downplays or ignores opposing arguments.470
Instead, opinions could recognize strong counterarguments that
some scholars argue can help judges avoid “decisions based on
their own culturally biased motivations.”471 This could both
466. Id. See also Terry A. Moroney, Emotional Regulation and Judicial
Behavior, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1485, 1505, 1522, 1524 (2011) (recommending
emotional introspection and disclosure).
467. NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., supra note 435, at 9. In one of the most
disturbing studies on the impact of judges’ mental state on decisions, economists
from Louisiana State University found that juvenile court judges who were LSU
graduates handed down more severe sentences to black defendants during the
week following an unexpected football loss. See generally Ozkan Eren & Naci
Mocan, Emotional Judges and Unlucky Juveniles, 10 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON.
171 (2018).
468. See Implicit Bias in Judicial Decision Making, supra note 443, at 117– 18
(suggesting judges should be required to write opinions more often in order to
encourage deliberation).
469. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(6) (“An order imposing a sanction must
describe the sanctioned conduct and explain the basis for the sanction.”); FED. R.
CIV. P. 65(b)(2) (“Every temporary restraining order issued without notice
must . . . describe the injury and state why it is irreparable.”).
470. Kang et al., supra note 12, at 43–44; Simon, supra note 16, at 137.
471. Paul M. Secunda, Cognitive Illiberalism and Institutional Debiasing
Strategies, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 373, 392 (2012). See also Kang et al., supra note
12, at 43–44; They Saw a Protest, supra note 3, at 896 (suggesting that jurors and
appellate panels might adopt a practice of “deliberate depolarization” in which a
person expressing his or her own opinion would also express the strongest
counterargument). This is easier said than done, however. The usual process of
analyzing complex materials involves the judge, whose brain seeks coherence,
unconsciously changing the evaluation of prior positions, and this process
operates at an unconscious level. Simon, supra note 16, at 19–20.
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highlight the need to consider those counterarguments and make
the process and end result of the decision clearer both to the
litigants and to members of the public who are interested in the
dispute.
Deliberation is also more likely when the judge has adequate
time to consider his or her decision.472 In addition to the usual
admonitions about taking time to reflect and avoiding making
decisions when stressed or tired, one statutory reform could be
useful here. A recent study demonstrated that the so-called “Six
Month List,” a law mandating the disclosure twice a year of each
judge’s pending cases and motions may actually have an effect on
case outcomes.473 The forced deadlines (to avoid public shaming
about perceived delay in disposing of cases) may in fact change the
way judges rule.474
Other potential interventions create systems that allow judges
to interact in ways that could help self-assess their decisions, look
for patterns, and provide each other with peer feedback. A number
of systems are possible, including collegial peer review committees
that meet periodically to talk about their decisions and associated
issues.475 Another alternative would be anonymous peer review,
including concrete suggestions about how to improve
performance.476
472. See Implicit Bias in Judicial Decision Making, supra note 443, at 111– 12
(suggesting that mindfulness meditation, which entails slowing down an
individual’s mental processes, may reduce implicit bias).
473. Miguel de Figueiredo, Alexandra D. Lahav & Peter Siegelman, AGAINST
JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY: EVIDENCE FROM THE SIX MONTH LIST (Feb. 20, 2018),
https://perma.cc/DMF6-HUNU (PDF) [hereinafter Evidence from the Six Month
List] (suggesting a law requiring judges to participate in biannual disclosures).
474. Id.
475. Implicit Bias in Judicial Decision Making, supra note 443, at 118;
Unconscious Racial Bias, supra note 253, at 1230 (proposing an auditing program
to evaluate judges’ decisions in the criminal justice system). For example, a small
group of judges could meet periodically to talk about their rulings on summary
judgment motions and the reasons for them. Implicit Bias in Judicial Decision
Making, supra note 443, at 109.
476. Implicit Bias in Judicial Decision Making, supra note 443, at 109. As the
authors note, it seems unlikely that judges would find this option attractive. Id.
at 110 (noting judges may be reluctant to utilizing auditing procedures, because
it could expose them to unfair criticism). A related example, also with political
drawbacks, would be to identify certain types of cases in which the unconscious
influence of heuristics could be particularly troubling, and handle appeals from
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Systemic practices designed to incentivize or require judges to
think about alternatives before reaching conclusions, to force
themselves to go through each step of the analysis, and to
articulate reasons for their decisions can be helpful in combatting
misleading heuristics and in increasing transparency for the
parties and the public.477 All of this also could help to reduce a bias
blind spot held by the judges when faced with heuristics and
training.478 But like training, they can do only so much. Our brains
are programmed to minimize effortful thinking, and our
socialization encourages us to reach decisions that are consistent
with our political identities.479 Further changes are therefore
necessary in order to enhance judicial fact-finding and decrease the
instances in which the inferences of a single judge will terminate
a case.
C. Procedure Rules
Procedural standards can do something that education and
awareness cannot: they can structure rules so as to foster the
development of a fuller factual record, leaving fewer gaps to be
filled by inferences and informing those inferences with a richer
and more nuanced set of facts. They can also make choices that
give great weight to the right to trial by jury and minimize the
ability of a single judge’s inferences to end litigation.
1. Pleadings: Stop Comparing Inferences
In theory, judges are not finding facts when ruling on motions
to dismiss on pleadings.480 During the last few decades, however,
those orders differently, assigning a de novo standard of review and a diverse
panel of judges. Unconscious Racial Bias, supra note 253, at 1231.
477. See Implicit Bias in Judicial Decision Making, supra note 443, at 117– 18
(suggesting a systematic requirement for judges to write opinions more
frequently).
478. See id. at 117 (proposing that “the discipline of opinion writing might
enable well-meaning judges to overcome their intuitive, impressionistic
reactions”).
479. Kang et al., supra note 12, at 1177.
480. See Elizabeth Thornburg, Law, Facts, and Power, 114 PENN STATIM 1, 2
(2009) (discussing the policy-based nature of the law/fact distinction). Through a
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changes in the application of procedure rules have led to a practice
in which judges allow cases to move forward toward discovery only
if they find the nonmovant’s inferences to be at least as credible as
the alternatives.481 That makes the judge’s assessment of
inferences overly determinative, especially when one realizes that
those inferences are not some kind of neutral mathematical
calculation.482
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,483
judges ruling on motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim have
been tasked with taking only “facts” as true and accepting
inferences only if they are “plausible.”484 Although the opinion
disclaims a requirement that the inference must be “probable,” it
rejects “mere possibility.”485 In fact, the Court has refused to find
an inference to be plausible if it believes another one to be more
likely.486 Iqbal characterizes the result in Twombly487 as a decision
that the phone companies’ parallel conduct was “more likely
explained by” an inference of free market behavior than illegal
agreements.488 Similarly, the Iqbal plaintiffs’ inferences of
discriminatory conduct were found comparatively implausible:
“given more likely explanations, they do not plausibly establish
this purpose.”489
Comparing inferences in this way puts far too much weight on
the judge’s own inference choices, colored by the judge’s experience
and attitudes.490 The question should not be whether the pleaded
kind of definitional sleight-of-hand, the judge’s decision that an inference cannot
be supported is defined as a question of “law.” Id.
481. Id.
482. See id. at 9–11 (noting that the law-fact distinction created in Iqbal
increases the power of judges).
483. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
484. Id. at 678.
485. Id. at 679.
486. Id. at 681.
487. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
488. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680.
489. Id. at 681.
490. See Thornburg, supra note 480, at 10 (asserting that the law-fact
distinction in Iqbal privileges appellate court judges’ impressions over trial
judges’ decisions).
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inference is at least as probable (in the opinion of the judge) as
others; it should be whether it is possible.491 The risk of heuristic
bias is so unavoidable under current law that any analysis of
pleading sufficiency that turns on comparing inferences must be
abandoned.492 We cannot know, for example, whether experiences
and heuristics contributed to the different inferences of the white
Alabama trial judge and black Florida appellate judge in Lewis v.
Bentley, but a rule structured so that they were not called upon to
compare the plausibility of racial discrimination and state-level
control would decrease this concern.493
Since Rule 8(a) itself does not mandate comparisons as part of
the Iqbal-mandated plausibility analysis, this change in analytical
method could be made without a rule amendment.494 Judicial
practices, though, would need to change; judges should not dismiss
cases because they believe an inference contrary to the plaintiff’s
is more probable.495
As to types of cases in which slanted heuristics are
particularly likely, a solution would need to come from outside the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The trans-substantive nature of
the rules precludes changes that single out specific substantive
areas for different treatment. Outside of the rules, though, changes
in substantive law that establish certain presumptions might help
highlight issues in which inferences are particularly likely to be

491. See id. at 12 (pointing out that judges may come to different conclusions
on the same record based on the evidence they consider and the inferences they
draw from said evidence).
492. See id. at 4 (noting the great risk of bias).
493. Compare Lewis v. Bentley, No. 2:16-CV-690-RDP, 2017 WL 432464, at
*11 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 31, 2017) (finding that the plaintiffs’ “conclusory allegation”
that the Minimum Wage Act was racially discriminatory “fails to nudge
their . . . equal protection claims across the line from conceivable to plausible”),
with Lewis v. Governor of Ala., 896 F.3d 1282, 1294–97 (11th Cir. 2018) (finding
that the plaintiffs stated a claim sufficient to infer that the Minimum Wage Act
had both the purpose and effect of “depriving Birmingham’s black citizens equal
economic opportunities on the basis of race” in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause).
494. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (stating pleading rules for a “claim for relief”).
495. See Thornburg, supra note 480, at 59 (asserting that the standard
promulgated in Iqbal defines “plausible” as excluding “mere possibility” whereas
in practice the Court has only found plausibility when it finds another inference
is not more likely).
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unreliable because of the limits of generalizations or social
stereotypes.496
2. Summary Judgment: Consider Only Inferences in Favor of
Nonmovant
The analysis in summary judgment cases works similarly to a
motion to dismiss, but no change in the law would be necessary.
Proper application of existing legal standards does not allow the
judge to choose among reasonable inferences.497 Rule 56 instructs
judges to grant summary judgment only if there is no “genuine
dispute as to any material fact” and the “movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”498 The temptation to compare
inferences comes from adjectives that modify the word “inference.”
In both summary judgment and directed verdict contexts, judges
are told to let the case continue if the nonmovant’s inference is
reasonable.499
Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and
the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury
functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion
for summary judgment or for a directed verdict. The evidence of
the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences
are to be drawn in his favor.500

The problem with these descriptions lies not in the
requirement of reasonableness, but in some courts’ practices of 1)
considering even impeached evidence in favor of the movant; 2)
considering inferences in favor of the movant; and 3) judging
496. See, e.g., Joseph A. Seiner, The Discrimination Presumption, 94 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1115, 1119 (2019) (arguing in favor of a presumption of employment
discrimination that would satisfy Iqbal’s plausibility requirement).
497. See Clermont, supra note 5, at 4 (stating judgment as a matter of law
focuses on “reasonable possibility” as opposed to a comparison of “infinite
alternatives”).
498. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
499. See Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 57 (1949) (addressing directed
verdict); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)
(addressing judgment as a matter of law).
500. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (emphasis
added).
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reasonableness comparatively, so that an inference only counts as
reasonable if, in the judge’s view, it is superior to others. Jurors,
the ultimate fact finders, are the ones entrusted to compare beliefs
in different possibilities.501 That is not the job of a judge ruling on
a motion that will end the case before it goes to the jury.
Greater emphasis on what may and may not be considered
would help clarify the mental process that a judge ruling on a
summary judgment motion should use. The judge needs to be
acutely aware that she should consider all evidence in favor of the
nonmovant and only evidence in favor of the movant that has not
been contradicted or impeached.502 (If evidence has been
contradicted or impeached, the judge would be making a credibility
decision, and that is not proper in the summary judgment
context.)503 Note also that, in the case of movants’ evidence, this is
limited to testimony from “disinterested witnesses.”504
In addition to the limits on what evidence to consider, proper
application of Rule 56 requires that the judge consider only the
inference in support of the nonmovant without comparing it to
alternatives.505 If that inference is reasonable, considered in
isolation, then the case should continue to jury trial.506
Unfortunately, some cases have considered pro-movant inferences
in deciding that the nonmovant’s inference could not be found by a
reasonable jury. For example, in the Chadwick case discussed in
Part IV, the trial judge granted summary judgment because he
rejected as a matter of law an inference that denying the plaintiff
a promotion was motivated by her status as a woman with young
children; to him, the inference that the same decision would have
been made about a man with young children had not been
sufficiently ruled out.

501. See Clermont, supra note 5, at 22 (noting the role of jurors).
502. Wilkerson, 336 U.S. at 57 (1949) (directed verdict); Reeves, 530 U.S. at
151 (2000). Although Reeves is about post-trial motions, the opinion notes that
the standard to be applied should be the same for summary judgment. Id. at 150.
503. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151 (“Credibility determinations, the weighing of
the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury
functions, not those of a judge.”).
504. Id.
505. Id. at 150–51.
506. Id. at 151.
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Other cases, especially those involving state of mind, reflect
the same kind of failure to analyze the record in light of the
limitations on summary judgment. One such case is Jennings v.
University of North Carolina,507 in which the trial judge, original
majority opinion, and dissenting opinion on en banc review
considered (and preferred) inferences in favor of the movant.508 The
plaintiff had been a member of the University of North Carolina
(UNC) women’s soccer team, and she alleged that the coach
“persistently and openly pried into and discussed the sex lives of
his players and made sexually charged comments, thereby creating
a hostile environment in the women’s soccer program.”509 The
Fourth Circuit’s en banc opinion concluded that the plaintiff had
produced sufficient summary judgment evidence to merit
consideration by a jury.510
The judges who would have granted UNC’s motion for
summary judgment considered contradicted and impeached
evidence in favor of the movant, and they also relied on inferences
in favor of the movant in finding the plaintiff’s requested
inferences unreasonable as a matter of law.511 For example, they
would have inferred that the coach’s frequent comments were
lighthearted jokes,512 that the question “who are you fucking”
showed concern that the plaintiff’s social life might be hurting her
academic performance,513 and that the plaintiff’s distress at being
cut from the soccer team showed that the impact of the coach’s
507. 340 F. Supp. 2d 666 (M.D.N.C. 2004), aff’d, 444 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 2006),
as amended on reh’g (June 8, 2006), and aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom.
Jennings v. Univ. of N. C., 482 F.3d 686 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
508. See Jennings, 482 F.3d at 691 (“Because Jennings was the non-movant
in the summary judgment proceedings, we recite the facts, with reasonable
inferences drawn, in her favor.”).
509. Id.
510. See id. at 701 (finding “Jennings ha[d] presented sufficient evidence to
raise triable questions of fact on all disputed elements of her Title IX claim
against UNC”).
511. See id. at 724–25 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (observing that the coach’s
long tenure as the head of the women’s team “makes any inference that Dorrance
is generally hostile to young women soccer players . . . preposterous”).
512. See id. at 719 (describing the coach’s behavior as “simple teasing”).
513. See id. at 720 (“[I]t was, in context, obviously an inquiry about what was
occupying Jennings’ time.”).
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behavior on her was not severe.514 Those pro-movant inferences
were quite likely influenced by the judges’ understanding of the
nature of athletics and player-coach relationships.515
The Supreme Court itself was guilty of considering
pro-movant inferences in its notorious opinion in Scott v. Harris.516
One fact issue required a decision about whether a fleeing driver
was endangering the lives of others.517 The summary judgment
record in that case included deposition testimony as well as a
videotape of a police chase.518 The decision turned not on facts
depicted on the video (e.g. “was it dark outside?”) but on the
inferences that could or could not be drawn from its depiction of
the chase.519 The trial court and Eleventh Circuit opinions
concluded that a reasonable jury could infer facts and reach
conclusions in favor of the driver: he posed no threat prior to the
chase, and during the chase he posed little or no threat to
pedestrians or other motorists (the roads were largely empty and
he remained in control of his vehicle).520 In contrast, Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion for the Supreme Court rejected any such
inferences as unreasonable as a matter of law, instead drawing the
inference in favor of the police officer who rammed the fleeing
driver’s vehicle.521 “Far from being the cautious and controlled
514. See id. at 723, 725 (claiming Jennings pursued the lawsuit out of “anger
and disappointment in being cut”).
515. See id. at 724
If Dorrance was then the coach of the men’s soccer team, he would just
as surely have teased his male players about their weekends with their
girlfriends as he lightly teased Jennings about her weekend with her
boyfriend. Such teasing about a player’s social life is the norm on any
collegiate athletic team, whether male or female.
516. 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
517. See id. at 378 (stating the first task in this case was “to determine the
relevant facts”).
518. Id.
519. See id. at 379–80 (describing the driver in the video “racing,”
“swerv[ing],” “run[ning] multiple red lights,” and driving “shockingly fast,” and
concluding that the driving created “a great risk of serious injury”).
520. See id. at 378–79 (“Indeed, reading the lower court’s opinion, one gets the
impression that respondent, rather than fleeing from police, was attempting to
pass his driving test.”); see also Harris v. Coweta Cty., 433 F.3d 807, 815–16 (11th
Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (lower court record).
521. See id. at 379–80 (asserting that the nonmoving party’s deposition was
“blatantly contradicted by the record” and that “no reasonable jury could have
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driver the lower court depicts, what we see on the video more
closely resembles a Hollywood-style car chase of the most
frightening sort, placing police officers and innocent bystanders
alike at great risk of serious injury.”522 Given his interpretation of
the events depicted on the video, Justice Scalia chose the inference
suggested by the movant police officer—the fleeing driver was
endangering officers and members of the public—and therefore the
nonmovant’s contrary inference was not reasonable.523 One can
hope that this type of analysis is limited to cases involving
videotape, as it does not purport to change the general rules of
summary judgment analysis.
Improved awareness of proper summary judgment analysis
could help avoid judges’ reliance on their own personal inferences
to take cases away from juries. We would not need to wonder about
the impact of differences in the experience of working mothers and
working fathers (and societal attitudes toward both) on the trial
and appellate judges in Chadwick.524 We would not have to worry
that different experiences with team sports, coaches, and “locker
room talk” would lead to different inference preferences where the
judge’s choice controls.525 Similarly, a plaintiff’s access to a jury
trial would not be heavily influenced by whether a judge grew up
driving on two-lane roads.526
Important policies underlie Rule 56’s requirement that judges
look at the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to
believed him”).
522. Id. at 380.
523. See id. at 396 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority opinion
“presumes its own version of the facts”). Justice Stevens’ dissent calls the majority
on its improper summary judgment analysis, and also suggests that the Justices’
experience may have influenced their inferences. See id. at 390 n.1
I can only conclude that my colleagues were unduly frightened by two
or three images on the tape that looked like bursts of lightning or
explosions, but were in fact merely the headlights of vehicles zooming
by in the opposite lane. Had they learned to drive when most
high-speed driving took place on two-lane roads rather than on
superhighways—when split-second judgments about the risk of
passing a slowpoke in the face of oncoming traffic were routine—they
might well have reacted to the videotape more dispassionately.
524. See supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing Chadwick).
525. See supra notes 507–515 and accompanying text.
526. See supra notes 516–523 and accompanying text.
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the nonmovant.527 The result of a denial of summary judgment is
a case that proceeds to a jury determination.528 In addition to its
Seventh Amendment significance, decisions by a multi-member
jury may be better able to overcome the heuristics and biases
discussed in this Article. Its broader array of experiences and
“common sense” make this possible.529 “[T]he controlled process of
trial and the forced deliberation of lay jurors could provide a
powerful antidote to not only overt biases and prejudices but also
to the more subtle warping of perception and rational thought that
stems from cognitive illiberalism and its cousins.”530
When restricting analysis to the proper parts of the record and
to inferences in favor of the nonmovant, a judge’s role with respect
to inferences is still very important, but its function is more
narrowly defined.531 It also has the advantage of keeping the focus
outside of the judge’s own personal probability assessment,
reminding the judge that other people with different experiences
can draw different but reasonable inferences.532 This approach
might in some cases lead to increased costs to the litigants and the
court because the litigation will continue, and the cost is more
worrisome when the movant ultimately prevails.533 However, these
costs must be balanced against potential advantages of avoiding
the dismissal of meritorious claims, the costs of successful appeals,

527. See Stempel, supra note 68, at 631 (“The very premise of summary
judgment is that there are no genuine disputes of material fact, and that no
reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant, and the law is so clear that there is
no valid reason to postpone entry of judgment.”).
528. See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150
(2000).
529. See Stempel, supra note 68, at 684 (asserting that judge-driven rejections
of claims may have Seventh Amendment violation implications).
530. Id. at 680. See generally Kahan et al., supra note 3.
531. See Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 57 (1949) (restating the rule
that judges may only look at the inferences in favor of the nonmovant when
deciding whether to submit an issue to the jury).
532. See Stempel, supra note 68, at 634 (asserting that judges are not good at
imagining conclusions drawn by a person with a different background); see
generally Kahan et al., supra note 3.
533. But see Edward Brunet, The Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 43 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 689, 689 (2012) (theorizing that denial of a motion for summary
judgment both saves court costs and creates a “settlement premium” for the
nonmovant).
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the importance of access to the courts, and the constitutional role
of the jury as fact finder.534
3. Develop a Record that Supports a Richer Narrative
a. Pleadings
Since the end of the twentieth century, the trend in civil
procedure has been to worry about costs and efficiency at the
expense of other values.535 As part of this trend, rule amendments
and changes to interpretation of existing rules have restricted
available procedures.536 Among other things, dismissals on the
pleading and the granting of summary judgment have been made
easier and the scope of discovery has been limited.537 All of these
forces have resulted in decisions based on a sparser factual
record– what one scholar has called “narrative-erasing
procedure.”538 The function of the civil justice system depends on
competing narratives, and narrative richness helps decision
makers choose from a fuller array of possibilities.539
Because as a group judges are highly educated and very often
members of a political or social elite, they may not share the
534. See Stempel, supra note 68, at 632 (“More likely is that the aggressive
use of summary judgment costs society more than would a procedural code with
no summary judgment mechanism.”); Anne E. Ralph, Narrative-Erasing
Procedure, 18 NEV. L.J. 573, 607–08 (2018) (noting the ample scholarship on the
decline of trial in civil cases and restrictive nature of current civil procedure).
535. See Ralph, supra note 534, at 607–08 (arguing that restrictive trends in
civil procedure limit access to courts for marginalized populations and impede
individual litigants’ rights to be heard in a neutral forum).
536. Id.
537. See id. at 609 (addressing the heightened pleading standard created by
Twombly and Iqbal); id. at 614 (asserting the proportionality addition in the scope
of discovery rule is too burdensome).
538. See generally id. “Narrative” in this sense means “a particular
representation of a series of events: a text or other embodiment of a certain telling
or treatment of a story’s events.” Id. at 577. A narrative is not the same thing as
a “story.” Id. It is, rather, the telling of the events from some particular
perspective. Id.
539. See id. at 589 (pointing to the relationship between competing narratives
and law in the trial setting).
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same “stock stories” with the litigants from outsider groups who
appear before them. But we know narratives can create
empathy and persuade in a way that cold logic or impersonal
data cannot.540

More information can lead to better inferences and more
evenhanded results. Plaintiffs who do have access to a richer set of
facts, then, should realize their narrative potential and plead the
underlying story.541 Providing a more complete and full-bodied set
of narratives can help judges combat automatic heuristic
responses.542 For example, judges considering plausibility of
pleadings may, if not given more information, rely on their own
narratives—those that their heuristics generate.543 “Given the
privileged position of judges, who tend to be well educated and
politically elite, [they may] unconsciously apply a master-narrative
that differs radically from the narratives that . . . members of
marginalized groups may wish to tell.”544 In order to increase the
probability that the judge will be able to make decisions on a more
information-rich record, procedure rules should be made and
interpreted to discourage dismissal on the pleadings without an
opportunity to do discovery.
Inferences are gap-fillers, and a record containing a more
complete collection of circumstantial evidence can better inform
the inference-drawing process. “The more gap filling and
inferential thinking that a judge has to engage in, the more room
there may be for explicit and implicit biases to structure the judge’s
assessment in the absence of a well-developed evidentiary
record.”545 Some of the additional information can provide the
540. Id. at 619.
541. See Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of
Civil Rights Litigators, 104 YALE L.J. 763, 811–14 (1995) (urging the use of
narratives in pleadings as a means to persuade); see generally Elizabeth Fajans
& Mary R. Falk, Untold Stories: Restoring Narrative to Pleading Practice, 15 J.
LEGAL WRITING INST. 3 (2009) (instructing practitioners to go beyond the “barebones form-book” pleading and incorporate storytelling techniques when drafting
complaints to provide a meaningful translation of the plaintiff’s experience and
“evok[e] in the reader a desire that justice be done”).
542. See Eastman, supra note 541, at 812 (suggesting that narrative is a tool
to counteract presuppositions and increase understanding of clients’ realities).
543. See id. at 813–14 (explaining the role that heuristics play).
544. Ralph, supra note 535, at 612.
545. Id.
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judge with facts that fall outside his or her experience, and it may
even alert the judge to perspectives other than his or her own. The
larger set of information inputs can also cue System 2 effortful
thinking, increasing the chances that an inference will be
deliberate rather than automatic.546
b. Discovery
Discovery decisions are the other significant procedural
context that could improve inferences by providing a factually
more complete record.547 Inferences come into the discovery picture
because much of the information sought may be circumstantial
rather than direct evidence.548 A party seeking discovery may be
asking the court to order production of material that arguably
supports an inference. For example, in a sex discrimination case
involving John Doe’s intent, the discovery sought might be not “I
heard John Doe say that he fired the plaintiff because she was
female” but “John Doe regularly tells sexist jokes to male
employees.” As was true in the cases described in Parts III and IV,
the discovery relevance decision turns on whether the judge
believes an inference from circumstantial evidence to the fact of
consequence to the action is sufficiently significant to satisfy Rule
26(b).549
In order to encourage discovery that will provide the court and
the parties with a more complete narrative, judges drawing
inferences can keep in mind the way the procedure and evidence
546. See Blinking, supra note 37, at 15 (postulating that judges did better on
a more difficult CRT problem because more difficult problems suggest “to the test
taker that reliance on intuition might be unwise”).
547. Just as narratives can be created at the pleading stage, broader discovery
can also provide parties with the information needed to present narratives in
motions throughout the litigation cycle. See Eastman, supra note 541, at 811–14
548. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 76–77 (pointing out that despite
the technical difference between direct and circumstantial evidence, no evidence
is truly “direct” because “every argument can be further decomposed to reveal
new sources of doubt or uncertainty”).
549. For a discussion of how a judge’s determination of the importance of an
inference to a party’s claims can affect discovery rulings, see supra Part III.C. For
real-life cases illustrating this dynamic, see supra Part IV.B.
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rules talk about relevance.550 “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any
tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in
determining the action.”551 The language of the evidence rule
makes it clear that the test should not require the discovering
party to convince the judge that the requested information is
sufficient to support an inference that is more probable than not.552
Rather, the information to be discovered is relevant if it makes the
inference more probable than it would be without the
information.553 The rule as written, then, encourages the judge to
allow discovery of a broader set of information, and that
information in turn can better inform the inference to be made on
the merits.554
Judges considering discovery requests should be aware that
fact investigation, particularly when it is done by those with little
initial information, may take the form of abductive reasoning.555
“Abductive reasoning” can be defined as “[a] creative process of
using known data to generate hypotheses to be tested by further
investigation.”556 From the information available at a particular
point in time, the discovering party may generate a hypothesis.557
If that hypothesis is correct, then the information sought should
exist, and the discovery request is aimed at finding it.558 Rather
than rejecting such requests out of hand as speculative or
550. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“[P]arties may obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of
the issues at stake in the action . . . [and] the importance of the discovery in
resolving the issues . . . .”) (emphasis added).
551. FED. R. EVID. 401.
552. Id. 401(a).
553. Id.
554. See FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee’s note (recognizing that even
evidence “essentially background in nature . . . is universally offered and
admitted as an aid to understanding”).
555. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 54–58 (noting that the acquisition
of additional evidence during fact investigation—especially in the early
stages—often requires parties to use abduction to build off the information
available to them).
556. Id. at 379.
557. See id. at 56 (“[Abduction] involves reasoning from the evidence to a
hypothesis that might explain it.”).
558. Id. at 57.
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irrelevant, judges should entertain the possibility that inferential
links between the information at hand, the hypothesis, and the
information sought may be convincing.
The proportionality factors emphasized by the 2015
amendments to the discovery rules can also be problematic with
respect to the impact of judges’ own experiences and biases.559 It is
unlikely that they will be removed from the rules, but their
application can be done with care, and with attention to the
possible impact of non-universal generalizations. When the rule
was adopted, the Advisory Committee left the question of burdens
of proof somewhat ambiguous.560 The Advisory Committee note,
though, provides both that “the [rule] change does not place on the
party seeking discovery the burden of addressing all
proportionality considerations” and that a “party claiming undue
burden or expense ordinarily has far better information—perhaps
the only information—with respect to that part of the
determination.”561 Judges considering proportionality issues can
avoid reliance on generalizations growing out of their own
pre-bench practice experience by requiring parties to produce
evidence to support the inferences relating to factors that are
objective and measurable.562 Similarly, judges should be acutely
aware of the possibility of generalizations that differ from those
that they access most readily.563 Finally, for those proportionality
factors that are inherently normative, judges should consciously
summon and consider competing policy values.564
559. See, e.g., Jonah B. Gelbach & Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law and
Economics of Proportionality in Discovery, 50 GA. L. REV. 1093, 1109–18 (2016)
(discussing the six Rule 26(b) proportionality factors and the way a judge’s
subjective judgments enter the analysis).
560. See, e.g., AGENDA BOOK OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 206
(Apr. 10–11, 2014), https://perma.cc/U76Q-UW37 (PDF) (noting that Rule 26 still
“does not specify which party bears the burden of proof”).
561. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
562. See Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 559, at 1111–18 (clarifying the
extent to which each of the six proportionality factors is objective and measurable,
and listing specific questions that judges can ask to evaluate each).
563. See supra Parts V.C–D (discussing the ways in which judges draw from
their professional experiences and implicit biases to create often improper mental
shortcuts).
564. See Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 559, at 1116–18 (suggesting that
judges balance the proportionality factors against employment practices, free
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Rule 26(b)(1) should be interpreted and applied with a policy
slant in favor of production, and this may in some cases increase
costs for the producing party. It is nevertheless an important
analytical starting point. Any increased out-of-pocket costs need to
be considered in light of the benefits of further discovery that
greater accuracy in decision making could bring to private
litigation’s function as an enforcer of legal norms.565
VII. Conclusion
When it comes to inferences, judges—like people
everywhere—should approach the task with great humility.566
Despite best intentions, non-conscious mental shortcuts are
working away, providing the human mind with information and
intuitions that are skewed by each person’s individual experiences.
Our very senses can deceive us, influenced by our social and
cultural commitments and helped along even by more deliberative
thought. While the cases discussed in this Article, and many of the
studies of judicial behavior, have focused on difficult and
important issues such as race, gender, and politics, there is no
reason to think that cognitive shortcuts do not affect all types of
decisions in all types of cases.
speech, and other matters that “may have importance far beyond the monetary
amount involved”).
565. See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND
PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 6–10 (2010) (characterizing private lawsuits to
enforce legislation as essential to legal infrastructure in the United States);
Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 71–72 (2010) (discussing the importance
of private parties’ assisting government agencies in the enforcement of
substantive law); Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and
Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1289–94 (1982) (discussing the necessity
of private rights of action for the enforcement of substantive law).
566. By using this term, this Article does not mean to pull in the full body of
academic research and theorizing regarding intellectual humility. It is
noteworthy, however, that this work is consistent with much of the scholarship
cited regarding cognitive and social psychology and with theories of cultural
cognition. See generally MARK R. LEARY, JOHN TEMPLETON FOUND., THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY (2018), https://perma.cc/V7FU-QPP9
(PDF). Leary defines intellectual humility as “recognizing that a particular
personal belief may be fallible, accompanied by an appropriate attentiveness to
limitations in the evidentiary basis of that belief and to one’s own limitations in
obtaining and evaluating relevant information.” Id. at 1–2.

(UN)CONSCIOUS JUDGING

1665

Yet fact finding, including the drawing of inferences, is an
integral part of the judicial system. It is not confined to juries, or
even trials, but is instead a pervasive part of the pretrial period.
These important decisions set the parameters for litigation success
and failure. The more we learn from psychologists about the
operation of our minds, the less tenable it becomes to stick with
the fiction that inferences are purely a matter of neutral logic. The
real nature of inference-drawing needs to be confronted.
The Federal Judicial Center is to be commended for the
education efforts it has already undertaken, and for including
social cognition as a judicial competency. Yet its programs require
systemic partners. Knowledge of the issue and tools that encourage
reflection must be coupled with efforts to motivate judges to avoid
relying too heavily on their individual experiences and with the
creation of structures that require effortful deliberation. Finally,
changes in the way the procedural rules are interpreted and
applied could improve the quality of judicial inferences, preserve
the power of juries to choose among reasonable inferences, and
enhance the depth of the factual record on which those juries will
make their decisions. There is no magic bullet to avoid the
challenge of humans using human cognition, but we can avoid
exalting the “experience and common sense”567 of individual
judges.

567.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

